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PREFACE

11

The 'Question of the Straits' is one of the oldest

and most persistent problems in European history. 11

Its age

is unknown to us for references are made to this important
commercial and. s.trategio post even in the mythology of Greek
antiquity.

The

than Helens,
trade from the
danelles,
toll~

T~ojan

wars were fought for

The cities of Troy
~ine

Either tha

from their
trade~e

cont~olled
ve.nt~ge

so~der

tpe

reasons

v~luable

point on the Dar-

had to trade at Troy or else

and dues were collected as the phips from the Medi-

terranean were transferred across the narrow spit of sand
before the city,

In an attempt to reach the source of supply

it was necessary to destroy the control of this passageway
or to lose the valuable trade,

The Greeks under Agamemnon

gained a control of the Hellespont which secured the path
to the rich regions of the Black Sea Areas enabling Greece
to grow and Athens to expand,

Athens by placing colonies

and dependencies held an unbroken route to the Euxine and
defended that policy much as Britain defends the route to
India at the present time.
Under the Roman Empire there was no question of the
Straits for the simple reason that by the time that Rome
had reached the Black Sea her sea rivals had all been destroyed.

Furthermore the grain supply from the Euxine so

important to Athens came from Africa during the Roman period.

ii
The route to the east was of more importance to Rome at this
time than the route to the Black Sea.
From 330 to 1453 A.D., Constantinople became first the
stra~egic

position on the land route from the west to the

east , and. then the important trading center of the eastern
Empire.

During this period the Italian cities had to cope

with the "Question of the Straits" among themselves.
them, it was merely a commercial question.

For

For the Greeks

it was an important question since the ctty needed to be
defended against the onslaught of the Moslems by means of
the city's strong walls and by the active fleet in the
Straits.
The conquest of the Straits by the Turks, beginning
around the middle of the fourteenth century lasted for
about an hundred years.
1453.

They accomplished this conquest in

Gradually the Turks were able to extend their control

over the entire Black Sea Area, .end until that time the
Black Sea was not entirely closed to trade.

However, be-

ginning in 1475 and lasting until 1774, the Black Sea was
considered as a "virgin sea.".

Not until Russia had estab-

lished herself upon the northern shores of the Black Sea did
Turkey give up her exclusive control over all shipping within that body of water.

By the beginning of the nineteenth

century, all of the important countries of Europe had gained
permission to pass their commerce through the Straits into
the Black Sea.

The problem of commercial freedom during

iii
peace time was pretty well settled, but Turkey through her
control was able to prevent foreign warships from using the
Straits and from entering the Black Sea.
The problem of naval vessels in the Black Sea began
during the Napoleonic period when the Russian warships passed the Straits on several oooasions, and even the British
fleet · succeeded in forcing its way to Consta.n.tinople.

But

with the Treaty or Tilsit in 1807 the "ancient rule of the
Ottoman Empire" wae recognized by Great aritain and warships
were

fo~ally e~oluded

from the Straits.

Until 1914 these

two views not only prevailed but were strengthened by various conventions and treaties,

(1) Increasing freedom was

secured for merchant vessels of all flags 1 and (2) European
public law finally recognized the principle of the closing
of the Straits to foreign warships during peace time.

The

realization of the first named principle received no opposition1 but the latter of the two principles was continually
opposed by Russia during the nineteenth century and the beginning or the twentieth century.

While England supported

firmly the "ancient rule 11 which forbade entrance of war
vessels, Russia tried in vain to open the passageway.
This in brief is the historical setting when the world
War broke out in the summer of 1914.

The purpose of this

paper is to give an account of the events which took place
during the years 1914-1923 in the establishment of a "New
Regime of the Straits."

1

CHAPTER I
Russia the Entente and the Straits 1914-1917

At the beginning of 1914 opinion in Russia regarding
the possible acquisition of the Straits and Constantinople
wa s, that reali zation of such aims were only

poss~ble

the event of a general Euro pean confl agration.l

in

However,

in spite of this attitude, pr epara tions were ma de for the
seizure of the Straits by force, possibly by 1917, in the
event that a genera l war did not materialize.2

Russia n

plans for the acquisition of the Strai t s were seriously
compromised because of the German influence at Constantinople.

The mi s sion of Lima n von Sa nders had ga ined for

Germany the ascendancy over Russi £tl1 influence in Turkey.
Russia's political and economic development in this direction wa s hindered bec ause Germany, if Turkey should. collapse,
would undoubtedly obtain a l a r g e slice of Turkey.

If, on

the other hand, Turkey successful l y maintained herself
Germany might ma ke a colony of her.3
Consequently a t the beg inning of the wa r Germa ny was
able through her l1Hssion at Consta ntinople to conclude an
1. See discussion concerning Sa zonov a nd his views in Fay,
S. B., The Origi~ of the World War, I, pp. 524, et seq.
2. Ibid., pp. 524-529.
3. See Kerner, R. J., "Russi::t the Straits and Constantinople
1914-1915" Journal o:t Modern History, I, pp. 400-403,
September, 1929 •.
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alliance with Turkey.

This was accomplished on August 2,

1914, while Russia was still trying to negotiate e. RussoTurkish e.lliance.l

This alliance was secretly negotiated,

signed, and maintained in secrecy till early in November,
1914.
In the meantime the Allies tried to induce Turkey to
remain neutral in the conflict,

offe~ing

to respect the

territorial integl'ity of Turkey in return fol' hel.' neutre.lity.2

But Turkey becoming indignant over the seizure of

two Turkish

wa~ships

being 'b uilt in Great Britain refused, 3

Russia had done all in her power to keep Turkey out of
the war despite her recognized designs on Turkey.
Russia's allies, however, were unwilling to make the
necessary concessions regarding the other Balkan States. 4
At this period, before war broke out between the Allies
and TurkeyJ there were two views expressed. in Russia rege.rding the Stra.i ts under the circumstances then existing.
M. Krivocheine, the Minister of Agriculture during the
period 1908-1914 thought that the Straits ought to be free,
the Turks should be driven into Asia, and Constantinople
ought to be made a neutral city .5

However M. Sasonov when

1. Ibid.J P• 403-404.
2. ~Edward Grey in the House of Commons, October 1~-s, 1915,
Cocks, F. s., The Secret Treaties, p. 43.
3. Kerner, R. J., ~:-cit., p. 405 and 406.
4. Ibid., P• 405.
5. ~ivocheine to M. Paleologue, French min. to Russia,
September 25, 1914. Golder, F. A., Documents of
Russian History 1914-1917, p. 58.

3

interrogated by M. Pa leologue st a ted tha t all Russi a desired at this time

11

",

/ '

/

Q,uant a liberte des Detroits elle nous

doit etre gara ntie eta trois conditione:

1, qutaucune

fortification ne puisse etre erig ee sur lea fl a ncs des
Darda nelles, 2, qu'une commission assistee d'une force
nava le fasse la police da ns les Da rda nelles et le Mer de
Ma rmora, 3, que l a Rus s ia a it a l'entree interieure du
·.

I

I

i3 osphore--pa. r example a. Douj oul<:dere--une st a t i on de cha rbon,

Cette question est pour noua d'un int ~r~ t vit a l.

Im possible de plus en diffe~er la solut~on. 111
A last opportunity wus of fered Turkey to remain neu-

tra l, , even after the forei gn ambassadors had been rec a lled,
on condition tha t Turkey should dismiss the Germa n officers
in the Turkish army and navy.2

Turkey refused this offer a nd

hostilities broke out between Turkey and the Allies,
This rupture wa s met in Russi a by a grea t deal of
enthusiasm.
p ression:
11

The g enera l a ttitude wa s simila r to this ex 11

The sick ma n is dying--wha t is to be done with

As for the liberty of the Stra its, it must be gua r a nteed to us, a nd on three conditions: 1, tha t no fortific a tions be erected on the ba nks of the Darda nelles,
2, tha t a com~ ission, as sisted by a nav a l force, police
the Da rda nelles a nd t he Sea of Ma rmora , 3, tha t Russia
may have a coa ling st a tion a t the ~nner entrance of the
Bos phorus--for exa mple at B oujoukder~. This question
is a vital interest for us, it is imp ossible to del ay
the solution any long er .. 11 Trans. b7 the present a uthor. ~ . Pal~olo g ue to hl . Delca ssd, September 2 6, 1914.
Prokovski, M. N., Ts aiska i a Ros s iia i Voina , pp. 75-77,
quoted in Golder, F. A ., .2.12.· cit., pp7 58-59.
2. Saz~nov to Benckendorf, November 1, 1914, Kerner, R.J.,
Qll• cit., p. 407.

1.

4

the inheritance?"

Prof. Alexieff of Moscow thought that

the Straits should be neutralized and Constantinople made
a free town.l

Others believed that the Black Sea should

be made into a Russian lake with entrance and exit controlled exclusively by Russia, the Bosphorus being made into a
Russian Gibraltar,2

Still another thought that it made

little difference who controlled Constantinople as long as
Russia held the Straite,3

The edito~ of the Pttrograd Ex-

change Gasette concluded an inquiry made

conce~ning

the

Straits by emPhasizing the necessity of Russia's gaining
a free passage through the Straits,

"'Russia. is the nat ..

ural heir of Turkey in Europe,'" the possession of . the
Straits and adjacent territory is necessary

first~

before

an economic and political union in the Balkans can be accomplished,

"'Such a task is alone worthy of Russia and

the sacrifices demanded by the present war.' "4

Even the

Czar was caught in the whirl and in a manifesto called on
Russia to fulfil her "historic mission" on the shores of
the Black Sea,5

England, realizing the strategic impor-

tance of keeping Russia. enthusiastic concerning the war,
as early as November 9, 1914, informed the Russian Ambassador
1. Hoschiller, M., L'Europe davant Constantinople, (Paris,

2.
3.

4.

5,

1916), pp. 78-79, quotea In Phillipson and Buxton,
The Question of ~he Bosphorus and the Dardanelles,
p. 200.
Ibid,, p. 201.
Prof. Kotliarievsky, quotr~d in Phillipson and Buxton,
~·cit., p. 201.
Ibid,, P• 203.
Kerner, R.J., ~· cit., p. 407.

5

at London th.:1.t the question of the Straits would be settled
11

in conformity" with Russian interests.l

The Czar clari-

fied the meaning of "in conformity wi th Ru ss i :=m interests"
on November 26, 1914, in a conversation with the French
Minister at Petrograd.

" 1 There are two conclusions to

wh ich I am always being brought back, first, that the Turks
muet be expelled from Euro:pe , secondly, that Con s tantinople
,/

must in the future be neutral, with an international regime •
••• western Thrace to the Enos-Media line should be given to
Bulgaria.
Str~its,

The rest from that line to the shores of the
but excluding the environs of Constantinople,

would be assigned to Russia.' n2

The Allied Attack on the Dardanelles
Early in January 1915, Winston Churchill was successful in putting through a plan of campaign against the Dar ...
danelles, a plan which he adopted at the outbreak of the
war and which he defended with a gres.t deal of persistency
and enthusiasm.

Such a plan, if successfully prosecuted,

held out numerous advantages for the Allies' cause, among
them being the opening of Russia's southern ports to the
trade of the Allies, and the influencing of the Balkan
1. Benckendorf to Sazonov, November 9, 1914, No. 649, Adamov,
Konstantinolle i Proli!I, I, p. 228, quoted in Kerner,
R. J. , .2£ • c t • , - p • 407 •
/
-La Russia des tsars pendant la ~rande guerre,
2. Paleo1ogue,
(Paris, 1921), I, pp. 199-200 1 quoted Inerner, R.J.,
.££. cit. ' p. 408.

6

states to join the Entente.l

Churchill had hoped to secure

Russian cooperation in the attack, but despite Sazonov's
appeals to the general staff Russia refused to participate
in the expedition.

As early a s December 18, 1914, Grand

Duke Nicholas declared that "'the seizure of the Straits

by

our troops e.lone was entirely out of the question,' 11 2 and
when Sazonov reported to headquarters the Bri tish plan the
Grand Duke approved t h e British program, but refused to
aid by sending t r oops.2

The inability of Ru s ~ia to send

troops to the Darda.neJl e s was thought to jeopardize the
Russian chances of realization of her desire s during the
early days of February,

Thus Prince Kudashev, representa-

tive of the ministry of foreign affairs at the army

head~

quarters, wrote to Sazonov February +0/23, 1915, that in
case the Allied attack on the Dardanelles was successful
and Britain offered the Straits to Russi s., she would not be
· able to accept the Strait s , and the Allies could only conelude peace with Turkey.
"'And therefore, the solution of the problem of the
Straits "in accordance with our interests" as we, vvho treasure the historical inheritance of our past, understand them,
will not take place. We must not only reckon with this
1. Mr. Balfour in the 19th meeting of the War Council,
January 28, 1915, Churchill, w.s., The World Crisis,
II, p. 162.
--2. Florinsky, M.T., "A Page of Diplomatic History; Russian
Military Leaders and the Problem of Constantinople
During the War," Poli tj._s~]: _?cience g_u~rterl}· , XLIV,
P• 111, March, 1929.

7

harsh fact but, ••• accept it, and endeavor to prepare public opinion for it ••• The annexation of Constantinople not
only now, when so many external conditions are so unfavorable to u.s , but even for a long time to come, will remain
a mere dream, because we s.re lacking in the moral and military power necessary to me.ke it come true.•"l
This pessinustic outlook was changed somewhat when
the news of the first general attack on the Dardanelles
we.s lmovm.

The Allied expedition had accomplished a suc-

cessful naval attack, February 19, to March 2, 1915 1 e.nd
the reverberations h eld shaken all Europe a.s ·w ell as ·the
Entente.

But owing to poor mana.gernent practically all of

the adventages which had been gained were lost.

Neverthe-

less the chance was taken by Russia to secure more definite
pronouncements from her Allies regarding their attitude to ..
ward Russian interests in the region.

On February 19

(March 4, 1915), the Minister for Foreign Affairs handed
to the French and British .Amba.ssadors a memorandun1 stating
the desire on the part of Russia to Bdd certain territories
to Russia a s a result of the WB.r.
"'The tovm of Constantinople, the western coast of the
Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmore., B.nd the Dardanelles; Southern
Thrace, as far as the Enos Media line; the coast of Asia
Minor between the Bosphorus and the river Sakaria and a
point on the Gulf of Ismid to be defined later; the islands
in the Sea of Marmora, and the isl~ds of Imbros and Tenedos.
The special rights of France and England in the above territories were to remain inviolate.
"'Both the French and British Governments express
J.'(~ediness to agree to our wi sh es , provi decl tb e r:nr
is won and provided a number of claims made by France and
theil~

1. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 10/:33, 1915, quoted
in Florinsky, M.T., ~·~it., p. 112.
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England, both in the Ottomm1 Empire and in other places
are satisfied.
111 As

far as Turkey is concerned, these claims are as

follows:
11

'Constantinople is to be recognized as a free port
for the free transit of goods not proceeding from or to
Russia, and a free passage is to be given through the
Straits to merchant ships.•"l
In the meantime, Great Britain had sought the aid of

Greece in her

e~ped~tion

help was not forthcoming.

against the Straits wnen Russian
But Russia learning of this,

promptly informed the Russian Minister at Atheps, sending
copies to London and Puris, t.hat Russia could not permit
the Greek troops to participate with the Allied forces in
the capture of Constantinople.2

Russia feared that Greece

might become interested in realizing her own "historic
mission", for it must be remembered that Greece had had
at one time some very real connections with Constantinople.
In a memorandum to Sir George Buchanan, British Minister at
Petrograd, Great Britain rebuked Russia for her attitude
regarding Greek participation in the attack on the Dardanelles, stating that if Russia. were unable to aid in the
e.ttack she should place no hindre.nces in the way of other's
help.3
~· cit., PP• 19-20.
2. Sazonov to Demidov, March 2, 191 5, Adamov, Konstantinopol i Proli Y.:i.., I, p. 189, quoted in Kerner, R. J. , ·
~· cit., p. 412.
3. Memo. to Sir George Buchanan, Brit. min. to Petrograd,
March 12, 1915, Pokroski, M.N., Tsarskaia Rossiia i
Voina, p. 82-5, quoted in Golder, F.A., op. c~t.• , p. 61.

1. Cocks, F.S.,

9

Russia had stated her desires but no definite reply
w.as given by the French or

~n g lish

regarding them. Eng-

'

land and France were not too enthusiastic over the prospects of assenting to the Russian claims.
tempts to pass the matter off to the other.

Both made atBut Russia

won ld not be satisfied with the half-hearted responses
that were made to her appeals, and Sazonov•s continued
efforts resulted in an announcement from the Brit!sh Government • . Sir Edward Grey in reply to the Russian queries
stated that:
" ••• the claim made by the Imperial Government in their
Aide-Memoire of February 19 (March 4, 1915), considerably
exceeds the desiderata which were foreshadowed by M. sazonov
as probable a few weeks ago. Before His Majesty's Government have had time to take into consideration what their
desiderata elsewhere would be in the final terms of peace,
Russia is asking for a definite promise that her wishes
shall be satisfied with reg ard to what is the richest prize
of the entire war. Sir Edward Grey accordingly hopes that
M. Sazonov will realize th a t it is not in the po wer of His
Majesty's Government to g ive a greater proof of friendship
than that which is afforded by the terms of the above mentioned Aide - IVIe moire. That document involves a complete reversal of the traditional policy of His Majesty's Government and is in direct opposition to the opinions and sentiments at one time univ ers a lly held in England and which have
still by no me a ns died out. S:lr Edward Grey therefore
trusts that the Imperial Government will recognize that t~e
recent general assurances given to M. Sazonov have be en
most loyally and amply fulfilled."l
In return for the richest prize of the war, Russia confirmed its " ••• assent to the establishment (1) of free
transit through Constantinople f or all goods not proceeding
from or proceeding to Russia, and (2) free passage
1. Sir . Edward Grey to Sir Ge o. Buchanan, Brit. min. to
Petrograd. Pokroski, M.N., Tsarskala Rossiia i Voina,
pp. 82-85, quoted in Golder, F.A., op. cit., pp.60-61.
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through the Straits fo1~ merchant vessels ••• ttl
antees were also given to
other regions, notably

res~ect

Mutual guar-

each others interests in

Persi~.

Sazonov now attempted to gain the assent of France to
the fulfillment of Russia's desires.

He stated the reasons

why it was reasonable for Fra.nce to acquiesce in the matter
in a note to the Russian Minister at Paris.
"On February 2:3 (March e, 1915) I tn~ French Ambassador
on behalf of his Government, announced to me (Sazonov)
that France we.s prepared to take a most favol:'able attitude
in the matter of r e alization of our desi~es as set out in
my telegram to you, No. 937,2 in respect of the Straits and
Constantinople ••• " ·

"In his converse.tions with you ,Delcasse had previously
more than once given his assurance that we could rely on
the sympathy of France, and only referred to the needs of .
elucidating the question of the attitude of England, from
whom he feared some objections before he could give us a
more definite assurance in the above sense. Now the British
Government has given its complete consent in writing to the
annexation by Russia of the Straits and Constantinople with ..
in the limits indice.ted by us, and only demanded security
for its economic interests and a simile.r benevolent attitude on our part towards the political aspirations of England in other parts !'3
It was not until April 10, 1915, however, that Russia
received the French assurances pledging Constantinople and
the Straits to her.

"'On April 23 and 24, during the negotiations for
Italy's entrance into the war, Sazanov obtained a final
formal agreement from England and France to the effect
that the agreements already made by the Allies remain in
1. M. Sazonov to Russian min. to London, March 7/20, 1915,

Cocks, F.s., ~· cit., p. 22.
2. See above, p. 9.
3. Sazonov to Russian min. t o Paris, March 18, 1915, Cocks,
F~Se, ~·cit., PP• 17-18.

lf.*o!U'"' ... '
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full force and ca n not be revised on the occasion of It a lv's
a dhesion to the Decla ration of September 5, 1914.'"1
·
Russia had now compl eted

~ 11

of the necess a ry di plo-

matic details le a ding to the fu l fillment of her "historic
mission''; the remainder of the task could only be accomplished by force of arms.

The success of the Russian dip-

lomatic efforts was due ma inly. to the persistence and tenacity of Sazonov.

It wa e l l"l.r g ely throug h his work tha t

Russia gained the Allies' recognition of Russia'e "special
interest" in the a rea of the Stra its.
It mig ht be a sked •nhy ·Prance a nd England consented to
the requests of Russia leading to the acquisition of the
Straits.

Althoug h it is not

cert ~ in,

the answer can pro-

bably be tra ced to those events which followed the outbreak
of the War .

Vfuen hostilities bega n, Russia was cut off

from her Allies in the

~ est.

With the first heavy attacks

on the Eastern front came a realiza tion that Russia wa s ill
prepa red for a conflict of such magnitude.

This realization

was borne out and Russia suffered immense losses, acc ompa nied,
of couroe, with a good dea l of dishe a rtenment.

The need of

encourag ement in the da rk hours was recognized, and such
encouragement as could be given by the Allies w6uld undoubtedly have helped the general cause.2.
1 .. Brit .. Memo., April ~23, French Memo., April 24, 1915,
Adamov, Konstantinopl~ J. Prolivy, I, p. 332, quoted
in Kerner , R . J . , .QJ2... c it ~ , 1) .. 414 •
2. Churchill, W.S., ..Q.J2· cit., II, p. 198.
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Suggestions for the Disposition of
Constantinople and the Straits
During the ,first years of the War a great deal of popular discussion was carried on in the various countries
concerning the ultimate disposition of Constantinople and
the Straits.

Phillipson and Buxtonl writing in 1917,

listed ten possible ways in which the problem migbt be
settled,
(1) Constantinople might be handed ov~r to Russia;
(2) Constantinople to be a free port under the R~aeian fleg;
(3) Constantinople to be placed under Belgian rule; (4)
Constantinople to be established as an autonomous state,
whose civil administration to be in the hands of the local
Greek population, and the military guardianship to be tempore.rily in the hands of the United States; (5) Constantinople
to be a free tovm and port under the collective guarantee
of the Powers; (6) as for the Straits, freedom of passage
to be granted to all vessels of all nations, Turkish control
remaining; (7) The Straits to be handed over to Russia.;
(8) The Bosphorus to be given to Russia and the Dardanelles
to another Power; (9) The Black Sea to be made a Russian
lake; (10) The Straits to be internationalized, and a regime similar to that of the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal
to be set up. "2
11

There were some people in Russia who believed that
Russian possession of Constantinople and the Straits might
work against Russie.n interests,3

Even internationalization

was a most difficult task to accomplish.3

Prince Kudashev,

it will be remembered, stated that he believed that Russia
1. Phillipson and Buxton, The Question of the Bosphorus
and the Dardanel:i'es, p:-2·24, et seq. - 2. Ibid.,-p7 2 G4, et seq.
3. Prof. Baikoff quoted in Phillipson and Buxton, ~· E~t.,
P• 201.

. . .....

~
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was not morally able to annex the Strait s .l

Quoting from

him:
"When I say 'morally' or 'spiritually' this is what
I mean: to settle down in Constantinople as crusaders
proclaiming the triumph of the Orthodox Church, is out of
the question because of our Pan-Slevic sympathies and af- ·
filie.tions, and our dislike of the Greeks; to add to that,
the moral authority of our clergy is hardly very high in
the opinion of the Greek clergy. To play the part so brilliantly perfot•med by England in Egypt, we are utterly incapable. Then, what is going to happen if, by a decree of
Providence, weobta1n possess i on of Const antin ople and the
Straits, etc.? Among other t h ings, we shall h ave against
us the local population me.de hostile by our ba.ekward administrative methods and especi ally by our t reatment of the
non-Russian subject s of the Empire; a lso Bulgar ia and Greeoe,
who have quite determined views about t he Strai ts .t e.nd
especie.lly about Constantinopl e; and then Rumania, whom
we are trying to win on our ai de and who will oe hardly
attracted by the rumors of our desire to settle down on
the Bosphorus, which would. mean for her the impossibility
of obtaining an outlet from the Black Sea., 11 2 ·
There were also those who thought that neutralization
of the Straits under Russia would be a satisfactory solu./

tion of the problem, Russia could institute a regime like
that obtaining at the Panama Canal, and in this manner she
oould insure commercial freedom through the Straits to all
the world.3

Still others accepted the principle of neutral-

ization without Russiru1 supremacy,4

M. Alexinsky, author

of Russia and the Great War stated that in his estimation
1. See above, p. 6.
2. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 11/24, 1915, Florinsky, M.T., ..2.E• cit., p. 113.
3. Reich, quoted in Carriere della Serra, April 1, 1915,
quoted in Phillipson and Bu..xton, ..2.E• cit., p. 210.
4. Alexinsky, G., Russia and the Great War, Eng. trans.,
(London, 1915), p. 302~ quoted in Pllillipson and
Buxton, ~· cit., p. 210.
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the "'be s t s olutio n i s the neutra lization of the Stra it s
EJ nd Constantinople; EJ.nd th:l t in the new adminintr c=;. tion to
be set up conformably there to the Ba lkan States--Ruma nia ,
Bulg a ri a , Greece and Serbiu --ohould be allowed to participa te along with t he Grea t Powers.'"l

In Paris the sugg e s -

tion wa s ma de th8. t the s ame rules be npplied to the Stra its
t ht:~ t

ob t a in over the Stra its of l·b.g el lo.n,

11

'whereby no

fortific a tions or milita ry works ar e to be ma int a ined or
esta blished,

And as for Con vtantinople, a n international

sy
s tem like t:Q.a t of To.ng ier o , is sugg e s te(i.'"2
,

A . J. Toyn-

b ee thought tha t Consta ntin ople a nd s urrounding territory
s h ould b e set u p a s

~n

inde penden t St a te wi t h loc a l a uton-

omy, with an inte r na tion a l rr1ilit a ry a dministra tion, which
should be under the gua rdians of one Power, preferably the
United States. 3

Sir :rfldwin Pe E1.rs writing in the ~ Re-

view st a ted tha t the

11

a ltern 8.tive to the p os s ession of Con-

st a ntinople a nd the two Straits by Russia ••• is that a small
interna tion a lized State should b e crea ted, to which both
Straits uh ould b elong , e nd of wh ich Const a ntinople should
b e the c ap ita l •..•

The sugg estion put forwa rd for a

neutra lized St a te is g enerPlly welcomed in England a nd
1. Alex in sky, G., Rusrda a nd the QreR. t Wa r, p. 303, quoted
in Phillip son o.nd Buxton, .9.£. cit., p. 211.
2. Aulne a u, J., la Turkie et la Guerra, (Paris, 1915),
p. 329, quoted in Phillipson a ndl31L"<ton, .2.12.· cit.,
pp. 219-220.
3. Toynbee, A .J. , Nationa l i..:tY. e.nd the Wa r, (I,ondon, 1915),

pp. 364 et seq., quoted in Philli pson and Buxton,
cit., pp. 220-222 .

..Q.ll•
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Fr a nce.»l

The clea re s t exp re ss ion of op inion from the

Da lkr".n St a te s was ma de by H. Da scovi.ci, in his book L.1.
Question du :B osphore et des Da rda nell e£ , in which he p robably reflected the views of the Ruma nia n GovernmerJt.
Coming from a sma ll St a te which ha s ha d to wa rd off
encro a chments of her territory, Da scovici protested vig orously against the pro positi ori tha t the Stra its be a ssig ned
to Rus s i a .

Such a cti on would but be t he first ste p in

Rus sia 's imperia listic pl a n t o ga ther in al l of the Stat es
bord e ring on the Black Sea ,2

It wa s not eoonomio re as ons

tha t prompted Russi a to. move tow a rd the Stra it s , he cla imed,
but the desire to crea te a va st .Asia tic Emp ire a nd to ma k e
Const a ntinop le a second Rome.
p a s possible:

aPa rler plus cla ir n'est

l a Rus s ie veut les de'troits, pa. rce que c'est

le seule moyen d'imposer s a lois a ux petits Etats de 1'
Euro pe sud-orienta l. 11 3

He states thn. t a s f a r a s economic

intere s ts were concerned Rumani a wa s f a r more desirous of
securing fr e e pa ss ag e through the Stra it s tha n Russia wa s,
for the a nnua l ex port a tion of Ru s sia's total ag ricultura l
out put wa s only 20% while tha t of Ruma nia was 55%. 4
1. Pea rs, E .. , "Fate of the Darda nelles,
IV, p. 658, July, 1915.
·

2. Da scovici, N., I,a Q.uestion dt!

11

~ os p hore

"Il

Yale Review, N. S . .
et des Da rda nelles,

p •. 289 ..

3. "Speaking a s clea rly a s
Stra its, b eca use tha t
her l a ws on the srna ll
Trans. by the present
4. Ibid., p. 282 .

possible; Russia desires the
is the only means of imp osing
st a tes of South Ea stern Europe."
author. Ibid., p. 290.
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resulte done, en chiffres, que la Roumanie est presque
/
trois fois plus inttress/e que la Russie 'a un regime
de
'\

1\

/

'\

complete et sure liberte de navigation cormnerciale a tra/

vars les detroi ts. · Et si 1 1 on ajoute

a cela

le fait qu'

ella ne possede
pas, connne la. Russia, d'autres sorties
"
vers le me.rche/ mondial, la proportion est surpa.ssee. ttl
For Rumanie., the unobstructed passage through the Straits
was considered a matter of freedom and independence~2

It

was a question of vital importance for al1 of the Balkan
States to keep Russia from the Straits,2

Neutralization

under Russian guarantee was not acceptable, for the Balkan
States feared that Russian domination over the Straits
would be very mu.ch different from England's control over
the Suez Canal or that of the United States at Panama.3
Smmning up his argument against Russia he suggested that
/
"'
/
de Constantinople doivent etre
desormais,
"•. ,ces detroits

ouverts 'a tous les navires de toutes les nations, en temps
de guerra comma en temps de paix. 11 4

The attitude of the

1. "It results then, in nu.mbers, that Rouma.nie. is almost
/

three times more interested than Russia. in a regime
of sure end complete liberty for connnercial navigation through the Straits. And, if one adds to that
the fact that she does not possess, as does Russia,
other opening13 to world trade, the proportion is far
greater." Trans. by the present ·author. Ibid., p. 283.
2. Ibid., p. 294.
-3. IbiU., p. 294. See also Phillipson end Buxton,~· ?it.,
-p. 231.
4. " •.• these straits of Constantinople must be open, hereafter, to all the shi p s of all the nations, in times
of we.r as in times of peace:-" Trans. by the present
author. Ibid., p. 292.

-------~ ---- -----·------

1?

Balkan States was recognized in England at thia time also.
11

1'Tei ther Rumania nor Serbia. 11 wrote Sir Edwin Pears, "has

ever made any claims whatever to the possession of Constantinople.

But I believe that every Balkan State without ex-

ception would desire the constitution of a small internationalized State rather than the permanent occupation of
the city by Russia..

To Ruma nia and Bulg{iLria in pa,rticular, .

this occupation would be a constant menace.
could only be in

oo~nunioation

Fo~

Russia

with a capital on the Boe-

phorus by sea and would naturally desire land transit;
thio she could not obtain for any practical purpose except
by invading the territory of Rumania and Bulgaria •••••• if
the small State already suggested were established, every
Power on the Black Sea and on the Danube would have free
navigation to the Aegean without dread · of the inter-Balkan
rivalriee."l
According to Phillipson and Buxton:

"Whatever advo -

cates there may be of schemes for assigning Constantinople
and the Straits to thia or that Power there is undoubtedly
an overwhelming majority of opinion in favor of internationalization."2

In accordance with the conclusions to which

they had come they outlined a plan whereby a system of internationalization under the collective guarantee of the Powers
1. Pears, E., 2£· cit., pp. 660-661.
2. Phillipson and Buxton, .Ql2.• cit., p. 215 ..

r
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would be instituted .1

They submitted a list of fifteen

principles ba sed on the instruments governing the Suez
a nd Panama ca nals for the reg ula tion of navig a tion.

The

Straits were to be free a nd open on terms of entire equality to ships of war and commerce at a ll times.a

Zones

were to be erected surrounding the Straits which were to
be immune from attack or othe r warlike operations for the
pur p ose of insuring the prot ection of the Straits. 3 In
order to carry out the provieions as outlined, a permanent international
to be crea ted.

commio~ion

to sit a t Constantinople was

This wa s to have the power to make addi-

tional regul a tions for the pur pose of facilitating navi. gation, policing the wa ters of the Straits, and in general
insuring good order.

The commission might be modelled on

the same basis as the Danube commission.4

As for Constan-

tinople. it wa s to be constituted a free town to be placed
under the joint protection of the Powers,5
key had ·betrayed her solemn trust she

11

and since Tur-

must withdraw from

Const a ntinople and the Stra its territory and leave both
to Europe to be made free a nd to be internationalized.6

1. Ibid. , p •. 236 ..
2. "'ibi'd., p. 239.
3. Ibid., p. 241.
4. Ibid., p. 241.

\

cf. these sugg estions with the Sevres
---arid Lausanne settlements infra. Chaps. II a nd IV.
5 . Ibid ~ , p •. 2 4 7 .
6. Ibid., p. 249.
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Germany Attempts to Separate Russia
from the Allies

In the meantime the war was proving to be a tremendous strain upon Russia, which we.s in no condition to meet
the modernly equipped German army.

Bulgaria had joined

the Central Powers in the middle of l915 1 thus making the
Russian situation on the Eastern front more insecure.

This

action placed a serious obsta.ole before Russia's ad.vence
toward Turkey.

In fact General Alexeev reported to Sazon-

ov that it was impractical to consider any territorial
expansion in any direction as long as so much of Hussian
territory was held by the enemy.

The main task at the time

was the defeat of Germany,l
Under such circumstances Germany made offers to Russia
in an attempt to separate her from the Entente,
von Jagov1 1 then the Minister

fo1~

In May

Foreign Affairs in Ger ...

many, speaking of a possible rapprochement between Russia
and Germany said that:
11

Tous ici sont d'accord que la paix entre 1 1 allemagne
et la Russia est une question
vitale pour les deux
pays
/ A
,
/
qu'unissent te.nt d'interets commerciaux et en realite aucunes divergences politi ques separent •••• La Russie ge.gnerait beaucou~ plus si elle faisait une bonne paix avec 1'
allemagne meme dans la question des Dardanelles, que 1'
all_emagne admet est une question de premi~re importance
pour la Russia. On est convaincu ici, que 1 1 angleterre
1. Prince Kudashev to Sazonov, February 5/18, 1916, Florinsky, M.T., ~· cit., p. 115.

\

/

voudra et insistera a avoir les coudees libres dens la Mer
Noire, HU.trement dit, qu 1 el1e voudra y dominer, car ella
se dit @tre 1 la Ma1 tres s e de la Mer'?
Ce serait un grand
danger si tm jour la Russia avait tme guerra avec l'Angleterre •••• L 1 Angleterre vise 'a obtenir l'influence dominante
A Constantinople et malgr( toutes ses promesses elle ne
permet t re jame.is 'a la Rus s ia de prendre cette ville ou
de la garder si la Russia 1 1 occupe."l
With such promises and warning s Germany tried to bring
Russia over to her side; if not to make war on her former
A1J.1es, then to conc lude a separ e.te peace with Germany.
"In e.ny oase, t h e chances of a separate arrangement
w1tl.1 Russia were excellent in t h e latter part of the summer of 1915 (1916)2 when Rus si a was in very serio~ s military difficulties e.n d the Czar had appointed the admittedly pro-German Sturmer to the pr emiership •••• I n the course
of the surm:ner and in the early autumn, numerous deliberations of a general char ecter were carried on and terms
considered; but all this took place privately among German
diplomatists or extended onlYt to conversations between
them and the Higher Command. •3
1. "Everyone here is in accol"d that pee.ce between Germany
and Russia is e. vital question for the two coun t ries,
th~t unite so many commercial interests and in reality, are not separated by political divergences. Russia would gain much more if she made a satisfactory
peace with Germany, even in the question of the Dardanelles, which Germany admits is a question of great
importance for Russia. Everyone hei•e is convinced
that the English will wish and will insist upon having
a full freedom in the Black Sea, in other words, that
she will wish to dominate there, because she is said
to be the "Mistress of the Sea". This would be a
great danger if some day Russ,ia had war with England.
England would e.im to obtain the dominating influence
at Constantinople, and in spite of all her promises
She will never allow Russia to take the city or to
guard it if Russia occupies it." Trans. by the present author. Von Jagow, Germ. min. for For. Affairs,
reported to Czar Nicholas II by Maria Vasilchikova,
May 27, 1915, Semennikov, V.P., Politika Romanovyki
Nakanunie Revoliutsii, pp. 15-19, quoted in Golder,
F. A. , ~. cit. , p. 45.
2. F.A. Goluer•s-correction. 1916 is the correct date.
3. Memoirs of the Cr9_w.P._ Prince of _germ~ny, p. 136-37,
quoted in---crolder, F'.A., .£12• cit., p. 51.
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However these chances were dissipated early in 1917
by the Cze.r in a Special Order of the Day,
not yet come:

11

The time has

the enemy has not yet been expelled from

the provinces which have been seized by him; Russia has
not yet attained the aim created by · this war--the possession of Czar-grad (Constantinople) and the Straits ••• 11 1

1. Nicholas II in a Special Order of the Day to the Army,
December 25, 1916, (Janua ry?, 1917), Loumsky, A.,
Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, pp. 47-48, quoted
in Golder, F.A., .££• ~~t.~-p.~

CHAPTER II
To the End of the War

While German attempts to draw Russia away from her
allies failed, the Russian Revolutions of 1917 separated
Russia from the Entente.

With these revolutions came the
By a series ot well·

overthrow of the Straits settlement.
pl~ed

diplomatic victories Russia had gained the oonsent

to annex Constantinople and the Straits.

As far as the

Allied Powers were concerned this problem was settled.

But,

when the radical wing of the revolutionists seized the Russien Government, the whole plan fell, leaving Constantinople
and the Straits to be the pawn of the victorious armies,
whoever that may happen to be.

This chapter, then, will

deal with the Russian renunciation of the Dardanelles, the
Allied victory over the Central Powers and Turkey, and the
resulting peace of victory imposed upon the Ottoman Empire.
Russia Renounces her Claims over the Straits
The first revolution that took place in Russia during
.

/

the year 1917 replaced the Czarist regime by a Government
founded upon Republican principles.

The nations at war

with Germany hastened to recognize the Provisional Government Which was more compatible with the avowed principles
for which war was being waged.

Democracy had been allied

with Autocracy in a war to "make the world safe for democracy."

Now the Allies were united with bonds of republicanism

~

.....,...

and democracy.
While making many changes in domestic policy, the
Provisional Government retained the Czarist foreign policies.

Thus, we find the new foreign minister stating the

platform.
"In the domain of foreign policy, the Cabinet ••• will
remain mindful of th~. international engagements ent~red ·
into by the fallen regime, and will honor Russia'$ word •••
She (Russia) will fight by their (Allies') side against the
common enemy until the end without cessation and w~thout
.f'al taring." 1
The Bolshevist party becoming increasingly powerful,
began exerting pressure upon tbe new government, especially
in the realm of foreign affaire.

This party looked for a

complete overthrow of Czarist principles, foreign as well
as domestic.

Consequently, it was no.t very _long before

Miliukov was turned out of office.2

lI
l

I
I

I

In a statement made to the publio foll9wing J:is fall

from power Miliukov demonstrated his sincere devotion to
11

Rus sis.' s Historic Mia sion. 11

He said t

"I admit quite frankly, and stand firmly by it that
the main thread of my policy was to get the Straits for
Russia. I fought unfortunately in vain, against those who
favored the new formula [no annexation, and no indemnity,
and the right of self-determination adopted by the Provisional Government with the fall of MiliukovJ, and that
Russia should free the Allies from their obligations to
help her secure sovreign rights over the Straits. I would
say, and say it proudly, and regard it as a distinct service to the country, that until the last moment that I was
1. Miliukov, P. Min. of For. Affairs in the Cabinet of the

Provisional Government. Note on foreign policy, March
18, 1917~ Sack, A. J., The Birth of the Russian Democracy. pp. 246-48. Golder;-F.A., ~· cit., p. 324.
2. May 15, 1917.
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in office, I did nothing which gave the Allies the right to
say that Russia had renounced the Straits."l
Though still maintaining its attitude towards the continuation of the war, the Provisional Government stated
very definitely its war aims.

On April 9, 1917, Prime

Minister G. E. Lvov declared that " ••• the Provisional Government considers it to be its right and duty to declare at
this time that the purpose of free Russia is not domination
over other nations, or seizure of their national possessions,
or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of stable peace on the basis of the e.elf-determination of peoples.

The Russian people does not intend to

increase its world power at the expense of other nations.
It has no desire to enslave or degrade anyone."2
When the November revolution placed the government in
still more radical hands, immediate peace was sought for
all nations who were at war on the basis of the "new formula."
The Soviet Government sent out invitations to all the belligerents in an attempt to stop the

war~

The other nations,

however, did not agree with the Russian viewpoint for various reasons, and they continued the war without the Russian
assistance on the Eastern front.

Russia concluded a separate

peace with Germany and her Allies, thus relieving the Allied
Powers of any obligations towards Russia at the conclusion
1. Miliukov, P. Speech to the Congress of the Cadet Party,
22 May, 1917. Reich, no. 109, May 24, 1917. Golder,
F.A., 2E• cit., p. 334.
2. War Aims of the Provisional Government. Reich, no. 73.
April 10, 1917. Golder, F.A., ~· cit., P• 329.

~

..........
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of a general peace.
Since Russia had renounced her rights and claims over
the Straits in this rather indirect manner, the British
Government aknowledged the Russian attitude and stated the
British viewpoint in the ' following terms:
" ••• we do not challenge the maintenan(}e of the Turkish
race with its capital at

Constantinople--t~e

the Mediterranean and the Black Sea being

passage between

~ntern~t1onalized

and neutralized." 1

Rise and Fall of War time Idealism
With the Russian re'nouncement of the claims over the
Straits and Constantinople there came a period when war aims
were restated in terms of world idealism.

The strongest

evidence of this widespread democratic outlook was manifested by the enunciation of the "Fourteen Points" of a
permanent peace stated by President Wilson in his message
to a joint session of Congress January 5, 1918. 2
message flashed around the world,

cr~ating

This

widespread feel-

ing of democratic nationalism among all the nations of the
world, particularly among the oppressed nationalities.
President Wilson's statements were quite generally accepted
by all the Allied Powers as being a clear definition of war
1. Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, January 5, 1918.
Cooks, F.S., ~· cit., p. 25.
2. Scott, J. B., Official Statements of War Aims and Peace
Proposals. p. 238.
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aims.

In fact with the exception of the Russian

pr~nounce

ments it was the only clearly stated group of aims.
With respec.t to Turkey these statements were of great
importance.

Prior to the war and during the early years

of the conflict there was a common feeling among the Governments~

that whatever happened to Constantinople and the

Straits. Turkey would have to quit Europe.

As the years of

the war passed, and the agresaive Imperialists became softened, the awing toward idealism recognized the
nations, and the position of Turkey in Europe
challenged.

rig~ts
b~came

of other
un-

The nations said with Wilson:

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire
should be assured a secure sovereignty, ••• and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the
ships of commerce of all nations under international guaranteea."l
Consequently, before the war had come to an end the
evidence seemed to indicate that Turkish sovereignty would
be respected and that the Ottoman Empire would not lose ita
capital.

At the same time, however, it was generally accept-

ed throughout Europe and

/~erica

that a more satisfactory
I

regime should be provided for navigation of the Straits than
had previously obtained.

For, during the war when Turkey

1. Scott, J~B., ~·cit., p. 238.
2. See also statements by Prime Min. Lvov, and Lloyd George
above. p. a4 and p. 25.
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had shut off the supply of Russian grain and produce from
Europe because of her control over the Straits, the principle of "freedom of the Straits" bece.me more persistent.
The Western Powers began to realize that this passageway
was of such importance that it should not be subject to the
control of a weak nation liable to the domination of a
stronge_r Power.

This position had just been clearly demon-

strated not only

d~1ng

the nineteenth century when England

bolstered up the Sultan's Government and secured advantages
because of her domination, but in the early days of the war
when Germany influenced the TUrkish policy.
In addition, this same spirit of idealism, which became
increasingly stronger, fostered the principles of internationalism, which considered world important centers and
thoroughfares as the heritage and property of mankind instead of that of any particular national group.
In the meantime the Allied e,rmies forged on in prose ..
outing the war on all fronts • .. Turkey was gradually worn
down till her resistance had all but vanished.

Before she

was entirely crushed, however, Turkey sued for an armistice,
October 14, 1918, accepting the program enunciated by President Wilson's "fourteen points" as the bases for negotiation.l
In accordance with t:his request, a meeting was held
and an armistice agreed upon and signed at Mudros, October
1. Scott, J. B.,££· cit., p. 419.
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31, 1918, between the Allied Powers and the Ottoman Empire.l

Aside from concluding peace and making other demands, the
armistice provided for the opening of the Dardanelles e.nd
the Bosphorus with access to the Black Sea, together with
provisions for the Allied occupation of the Dardanelles and
Bosphorus forts.2
A few days later British warships etean\$0. into the
Sea of

M~~mora

and dropped anchor in front of Conetantinople,

while an interallied force oocup1ed the city.

In thie. manner

the Powers gained a secure foothold for futu:re

negoti~tions.

Armies of occupation have usually served well

peace

dur~ng

pe.rleys, and this instance proved to be no exception.
Eleven days after the signing of the Mudros e.rmistioe
the war on the western front was terminated and the world
faced the tremendous task of reconstruction,
By February 15, 1919, the Straits had been reopened to
commerce by the War Trade Board through the action of the
Supreme Economic Council in Paris.
During this same year the Allied Powers met at Versailles in an attempt to bring peace to the world.

In

their anxiety to arrive at a settlement of the European
question they totally ignored Turkey and the Straits question.

This delay in negotiating a near eastern peace was

1. Scott, J. B., E£• cit., p. 419.
2. Official Britisn paraphrase of the Mudros Armistice.
The London Times. November 2, 1918, P• 7.
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fatal to the Allied cause.

For, during the period follow-

ing the war the Sultan's Government at Constantinople suffered a temporary relapse.

By this time the Moslems in Anatolia

had become aware of the intentions of the Allied Powers to
overthrow the principles of a permanent peace as outlined
by Wilson.

They realized that the Allies would probably

divide among themselves the Turkish territories with a view
to exploitation.
This feeling quickly spread throughout the entire
Mohammedan world.

When it became known that the J\lliea

planned to separate Turkey from her capital and depose the
Sultan, the feeling increased.

Great Britain wae most con-

cerned over this Moslem indignation, being the greatest
Mohammedan Power.

In India meetings were held denouncing

this intended blow at the very heart of the Moslem power,
for it must be remembered that the SUltan was

~ot

only the

head of the Ottoman Empire, but also the apex of the entire
Mohammedan religious organization.
This Pan-Islamic movement, though not centered in the
Levant, gave strength and courage to the rising Nationalist
leaders Who

w~re

heading the movement for a revival of

Turkish nationalism centered in central Anatolia.l
The dominating Mustapha Kemal.Pasha gathered together
the Turkish National Assembly at Angora in 1919; the object

s.,

1. Davis, Wm.
· A Short History of the Near East.
and footnote.-

p. 391

,.,...... ..
~
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being to establish a truly national Turkish State separate
from the time-worn Government of the Sultan and his ministers sitting at Constantinople.

Though not connected

officiall y with the Sultan's Government this group had
great influence upon Constant inople and its policies.

How-

ever, the British warships in the Golden Horn had a greater
influence, and the Sultan was not only maintained b';y- the
inglish, but he was also domina t ed by t hem.
As early as June 17, 1919, the Turkish delegation asked
for national preservation on the Bosphorus,l

But tbe ques-

tion remained undecided while the Peace Conference was trying to settle other questions.

As time went on, rumors were

abroad that Constantinople was to be made a "free city" in
an internationalized State at the Dardanelle~.2

The longer

the Conference put off a decision, however, the stronger
grew the nationalist movement.
On

January 5, 1920, the National Assembly at Angora

passed the National Pact, pledging the membe rs of the Assembly to labor for the establishment of a free, sovereign
nation.

Article IV of that Pact declared that:

"The security of Constantinople--the capital of Turkey
and seat of the caliphate--and that of the Sea of Marmora
must be sheltered from any attack.
"This principle having been laid down and accepted,
the TurkiSh Nation is ready to subscribe to any decision
1~

Current Histori, Vol. X, p. 247.

2. lbid, P• 530.
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which ma y be t aken by common ag r e ement b etween the Turki s h
Government, on the one p ~. rt, v1i th a view to ensurine; the
opening of the Straits to world tra de a nd to interna tiona l
communic a tions.»!
Had the Allies rnnde a n immedia te pea ce with Turkey they
mi e;ht bave been a ble to dis pose of Const a ntino ple a ccording
to their own wishes, but the dela y wa s costly.

The Supreme

Allied Council announced on Februa ry 15, 1920, tha t the
Turkish Government would b e a l l owed to rema in at Const a ntinople.

Turkei wa s to g ive a dequa te gua rantees, howeve r ,

rela tive to the Stri its.

The Allies were to mainta in a

strict military a nd nava l control over the Stra its,2
This decision met a good de a l of op position in Grea t
Brit a in where many believed tha t the only method of safeg ua rding the Straits wa s to rout the Turks out of Euro pe.
It was cha r g ed tha t the British viceroy in India , fe a ring
further trouble with Britain's seventy million Moslems,
\

persua ded the Government to in s ist upon this move.3
a decision

wa ~

Such

considered a hug e s a crifice of British and

world interest s for the s a tisfa ction of the Indian Moslems.
On May 11, 1920, a dra ft tre a ty wa s ha nded the Turkish
delegation cont a ining ma ny humili a ting a nd un a c cep t a ble
1. Article IV of the Turki sh 1:-a tiona l l)act of J a nua ry 5 ,
1920; Current Histq_!'.;y_. Vol. ~~VII, :pp .. 280-281, November, 1922.
2. Current History. Vol. XI, p. 43 5, March 1920.
3. See for instance A. J. Toynbee, "Meaning of the Constantinople Decision." New Euro_pe, Vol. XIV, p. 129,
Februa ry 26, 1920; a nd "Mr. Mont agu's Pound of Flesh"
by the s ame a uthor on pag e 145 of the same i ss ue of
Uew Europe.
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terms, hardly in ace ord with Wilson' s "Fourteen Points".
The spirit of world idealism, so strong during the last
years of the war, had not been able to survive.

Great

Britain, France, Italy, and Greece had nationalistic ambitions in Turkey which were demanding recognition.
The Turkish delegation presented a vigorous pr·otest
to the Peace Conference, outlining their objections to the
imposition of such terms and making suggestions more oo.mpat1ble with Turkish sovereignty,l

11 tp

But

the victors go

the spoils," and with very few concessions the Treaty was
approved by the Sultan's Government with the British warships anchored near his palace.

'\

The Treaty of Sevres was

signed by the Allied Powers on August 10, 1920.

The Treaty of Sevres and the Straits
Territorially, Turkey was practically excluded from
Europe being replaced by Greece;2 the rights of sovereignty
over the city of Smyrna and hinterland were ceded to Greeoe;3
the islands of Imbros, and Tenedos were ceded4 and other
dispositions made with regard to

~lrkish

territory not re-

lated specifically to the problem at hand.

Greece under the

treaty would have a position on the Straits, but was to
accept for herself all the limitations

i

I
\

l
1

place~

on Turkey for

1. These will be discussed at the beginning · of Chapter III.
See also map, Appendix II.
2~ Art. 27, Treaty of Sevres.
3. Art. 65-83.
4. Art. 84.
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the freedom of the Straits. 1

The Sea of Marmora and the

Dardanelles were to remain Turki~h.2
Subject to treaty provisions, the rights and title of
the Turkish Government over Constantinople were not to be
affected and the Sultan was to be permitted to reside there
and maintain the Turkish capital.

However, if Turkey should

fail to observe the provisions of the treaty, the Allied
Powers reserveQ. tne

;ri~ht

to modify those provisiqns and

TUrkey was to ~ree to such disposition as might QO made.3
tt'l'he navigation of the Straits, inclu(iing the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorua, shall in the
future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of
commerce or of war and to military and commercial aircraft,
without distinction of flag.

"These waters shall not be subject to blockade, nor
shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of
hostility be committed within them, unless in pursuan.ce of
a decision of the Council of the League of Nations.•4
In order to undertake further measures to insure the
freedom of the Straits the Greek and Turkitth Governments
in eo far as each was concerned, were to delegate to the
Straits Commission the control of the waters between the
Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles and the Black Sea
mouth of the Bosphorus, and to the waters within three miles
of each of these mouths; this authority could have been exercised on shore to such an extent as might have been necessary for the execution of the duties assigned it.5
1. Art. 38 ..
4. Section 11

2 .. Art. 27.
Article 37 ..

3 .. Art. 36 ..

5. Art .. 38-39.
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commission was to have been composed of representatives
appointed by the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan,
Greece, Rumania, the United States "(if and when that Government is willing to participate)", Russia "(if and when
Russia becomes a member of the League of Nations)", Bulgaria and Turkey "(if and when the two latter States become members of the League of Nations.)"

Each was to ap-

point one representative and all were to have had two votes,
except the representatives of Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria,
and Turkey, who were to have h ad one vote each.l

The com-

missioners were to enjoy diplomatic immunities within their
sphere of authority and were to exercise the powers

confe~red

upon them in complete independence of the local authority.
"It will have its own flag, its own budget, and its . separate
organization. "2

The Commission

was

to be charged with "the

execution of any works considered necessary for the improvement of the channels or the approaches to harbours; the
lighting and buoying of the channels; the control of pilotage and towage, the control of anchorages; the control necessary to assure the application of the special regime provided for certain specified ports of international concern;
the control of all matters relating to wrecks and salvage
and the control of literage."3

In case the Commission

should find that the liberty of passage was being interfered
1. Art. 40.

2. 41-42.

3. Art. 43.

35

with, it was to inform the Allied representatives at Constantinople who were to provide the occupying forces, which
were to be maintained by the Powers acting in concert, in
order to

pre~ent

any action being taken or prepared which

might directly or indirectly prejudice the freedom of the
Straits.

These representatives were then to act in concert

with the naval and military commanders of the said forces
taking such measures as might be deemed neceesary.

Similar

action was to be taken by the representativea in the event
of any external action threatening the freedom ot the Straits,l

In order to facilitate the execution of its duties the Com..
mission was to be allowed to organize such special police
forces as might have been deemed necessary, drawn so far
as possible from the native population residing within the
zone of the Straits, excluding the Greek islands of Lemnos,
Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos and Mitylene,

The special police

force was to be commanded by foreign police officers appointed by the Commission.2

In all matters relating to naviga-

tion within the Straits all ships were to be treated on
terms of absolute equali ty3; and e.ll dues and charges imposed
by the Commission were to be levied without discrimination.4
The Commission was to have enjoyed power to acquire property
or permanent works, raise loans, and levy dues,5

Certain

sanitary functions formerly exercised by certain specified
1. Art. 44 and 178.

2. Art. 48.

4. Art. 54.

5. Art. 46.

3. Art. 52.
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organizations were to be discharged under the authority of
the commission.l

Provisions were made concerning the exer-

cise of jurisdiction.2

The transit of war vessels was to

. be in conformity to the regulations set forth, in terms of
the Suez Canal Convention signed at Constantinople October
29 ,. 1888, providing for the 11a.ssage of veesels through the
Suez Canal,.3 subject to the reservation that nothing was to
limit the powers of a belligerent or belligerents acting in
pursuance of a decision by the Council of the Lea.gue of
Nations. 4
For the purposes of guaranteeing the freedom of the
Straits a demilitarized zone was provided for, including
the Straits and littoral for several miles inland.5

Further,

all works, fortifications and batteries within the zone and
in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothraoe, Tenedos, and
Mitylene were to be disarmed and demolished..

The recon-

struction of these works or similar works was to be forbidden •
The Allies were to have the power to prepare for demolition
any existing roads or railways in the zone and islands which
would allow for the rapid transportation of mobile batteries.
The construction of such roads was to be forbidden.

The

Allies, France, Great Britain, and Italy, were to have the
right to maintain in the zone and islands such military and
air forces as might be considered necessary to prevent any
1. Art. 46.
2. Art. 49-50.
3. Art. 56-59. For Suez Canal Convention see J. B. Moore,
A Dig of Int. Law. Vol. III, p .. 264-266.
4. Art .. 60.
5 .. Art. 179. See map. Appendix II.
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action being taken or prepared which might prejudice the
freedom of the Straits.l
These provisions dealt with the regime that was to
have been established on the Straits.

In addition to these,

there were many other provisions in the peace treaty which
were strongly opposed, especially those dealing with Turkish
economic and financial control.
Thus peace was to have been secured between Turkey
and the Allied Powers.

But by the time the treaty was

signed in August of 1920, there was so much opposition to
the treaty that the probabilities for its enforcement were
very meagre.

1. Art. 178.
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CHAPTER III

"
Turkey Repudiates the Treaty of Sevres

"

The Treaty of Sevres was a peace forced by the victors
upon the van qui shed, and, as is usually the case, many objections had arisen even befol"e it ha.d been signed.

In

fact one Turkish Cabinet fell over the issue of whether or
not to accept the treaty.

A new Cabinet had to be formed

end a new Turkish del eg ation sent to Paris to "betray"
Turkey.

If the Sultan's Government opposed the signing

of the treaty, it can only be imagined how inuch mo:re the
Nationalist Government disapproved of the peace terms,
The Turkish Government prepared a pamphlet stating its
objections to the proposed treaty which was presented to
the Paris Peace Conference July 8, 1920.1

Only the por•tion

dealing with the Straits will be considered here.
Objection we.s raised to the number of supposedly authoritative bodies that were to be created for carrying out the
terms of various sections of the treaty,

1bese bodies

were to he.ve jurisdiction over portions of Turkish territory,2

First, there would be the Sultan and .his Govern-

ment at Constantinople in whom the rights and title over
1. Delegation Propaganda, Paris Peace Conference,
1919,
/
/
Miscellaneous, Turkey. Observations generales presentees ~r la delegation Ot t omane K ~ Conf?rence
de la ~~ July 8, 1920; - ---·--- - - --2. Ib!a.-,-pp. 12-14.

,_ ..

39

the territory were to be maintained; second, there was to
be the Commission of the Stra.its in whom great powers of
control and regulation were to reside; third, there were
to be the military authorities commanding the Allied armies
of occupation; fourth there we.s to be a sort of a deliberative council composed of the military commanders mentioned
and the diplomatic representatives of Fl'ance, Gree.t Br1 te,in,
and Italy; fifth, there was to be the Inter-allied commission of control and Military organization; sixth., the Fine.n ce Commission; seventb , the Council of the Public Otto""!
man Debt, and last, the consular jurisdiotions,l
These eight organizations having various amounts of
jurisdiction would each be independent,

The relationships

that were to exist amongst them were very vague.

Further

the sovereignty that was to be possessed by each body was
not clee.rly defined. 2

Under such conditions the sovereignty

of the Ottoman Empire was to be restricted beyond bounds of
necessity,

Their work would be aimed against the sovereignty

of the State which could not be allowed, according to the
Turkish delegation.
The next objection was ranged against the composition
and duties of the Straits Commission.

This body was set

up for the express purpose of guaranteeing the internationalization of the Straits.3
1. Ibid., PP• 12-14.
3. Ibid., p. 11.

In reality, so ran the Turkish
2. Ibid., p. 12.
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argument, the Commission was to represent certain of the
Powers to the exclusion of others.l

It was not even to

be representative of the League of Nations.

Moreover, each

of the principal rowers was to have two votes while the
remaining States were to have only one each. 2

This would

lead to an unequal amount of influence being exercised by
Such an arrangement was contrary to the
principle of equality· among Stm.tes. 3 This unequally rea tew Powers.

presentative body wa1;3 to have

~

sort of e.n international

judioal personality, without being a State, it was to have
its own fle.g, its own budget, its

O\~n

organization and even

its own legislative and administrative sphere,3

All of

these attributes of statehood would place important limitations and restrictions upon Turkish sovereignty and power,3
This situation would surely make for numerous conflicts between the Turkish Government and this new regime,3
Furthermore, the commission, which was to guarantee
the internationalization of the Straits, was to allow the
military occupation to continue its authority which was
not to be an international authority.4

Instead, there

were to be the military commanders, each representing his
own particular State and subject to the.t State. 4

The dis-

position of the military and naval forces under him would
be in the interests of his own State.
1. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., p. 12.

This condition would

2. Ibid., p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. 13.

be a source of conflict with the Turkish Government, the
consequences of which might be of extreme gravity .. 1
The Council of Representa tives of the occupying Powers
would not confo~ to diplomatic usage.2, The diplomatic agents accredited to the Sultan would be supposed to discuss ·
with the Straits Commission and with the Military commanders
measures to be exercised against Turkey and even

ag~inst

other States in the attempt to preserve the freedom of the
Straits~2

Such requirements would be incompatible with the

duties of diplomatic agencies under international law.2
All of these provisions which the peace treaty provides
are quite obviously not in accord with the twelfth point in
President Wilson's "fourteen points" and therefore unacceptable to Turkey.3
The Turkish suggestion at this point was ·that the internationalization of the Straits could only be realized by
means of an international organization founded on a judicial
basis and represented by all of the States. 4 The League of
Nat ions would be entirely qualified to assure the realizo.tion of such an organization .. 4

This could be done by delegating a high neutral Comrn issioner. 4
Turkey objected to the proposed demilitarized zones
because they were far too large. 5 It would be to the benefit
1 ... Ibid .. , p .. 13.
3. Ibid.' pp .. 13-14.
5 ... Ibid., pp. 14-15 ..

2. Ibid., P• 13 ..
4 .. Ibid., p. 14 ..
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of the Straits regime if the· zones would be reduced to
such size as would be absolutely necessary for the .assuring of the freedom of the straits.l

A much smaller zone ·

was therefore suggested.!
Turkey agreed to the provisional occupation of Ottoman territory so long as trouble existed in Asia Minor,
but

as

soon as order was n1aintained tbe n e ed of oooupation

would be at an end.2

Unt il that time the ~ e troop s on Tur-

kish soil would continue to be a direct t h reat at Turkish
sovereignty.2
In regard to the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace,
Tenedos, and Mity1ene, their possession by Turkey was considered necessary for the maintenance of that freedom of
the Straits which was so nrucb desired.3
Turkey even agreed not to have any fortified works on
the shores of the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles or the Sea. of
Marmora within a smaller demi lit arized area such as suggested
by Turkey.4

Turkey was quite willing to accept all res-

trictions of her sovereignty which were necessa_ry for the
assurance of the liberty of n avigation within the Straits.5
But restrictions beyond that p oint, became threats.5
Especially during war ti me it wa s necessary for Turkey
to have more freedom of action in order to safeguard the
1. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
3. Ib-id:., p . 15 .
5. Ibid., p. 15.

2. Ibi d ., P• 15.
4. Th_fci. , p. 15.
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Straits and to protect her cBpital and territories.l
wished to have the

auth01~i ty

She

to admit or deny entrance of

warships into the Dardanelles or Bosphorus.2

This could

be done in conjunction with the Straits conunission; such
~

disposition of authority would be more in keeping with

the principle of equality.3

In this manner both Turkey

and the Allies would be protected,
To attain this equita.ble 1"egime for tne Stl:'aits which
all desired, the Turkish delegt:ttion suggested tnat regulations be drawn up similar to those governoiting the Suez _
Canal as embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople o;f 1888.4
Such an agreement would not only insur•e Turkish sovereignty
over the Straits but would place up on Turkey the obligation
to guarantee and maintain freedom of transit therein.
Thus ended the Turkish objections and proposals which
concerned the Straits,

But the Turks were not the only

"
ones who were dissatisfied with the settlement of Sevres,
Although the Allies had agreed to the terms of the peace
there were objections raised in severa.l of the countries,
France fea.red that Great Bri te.in was using Greece to further
English interests in the eastern Mediterranean ar•ea at the
expense of French intere sts.
1.
2.
3,
4.

France was willing to resort

Ibid., pp. 15-16,
Ibid., pp. 15-16.
Ibid., p. 15.
Ibid., p. 16. For Convention of 1888, see Moore, J .B.
--x-Digest of International Law, III, pp. 264-266.
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to almost any means in order to safeguard her prestige in
this area.

Italy was perturbed because of the great gains

"
that Greece had made at Sevres.

Greece had been accorded

large amounts of Turkish territory, largely through the influence of Great Britain, and it wa s to Italy's best interests to keep Greece from becoming a rival in the Mediterranean region.

In Russia dissatiafa ction was found with the

trea ty, because Russ ia. was not given s ufficient guarantees
for the safety of he r southern littoral.

lt

w~s

pointed

out that unless all wa rships were permanently excluded
from the Straits and the Black Sea , Russia's southern rivage of 2.230 kilometres would be laid open to attack.l
Such an arrangement would be quite unacceptable to Russia.
In England there were a few who believed that the treaty
wa s too light a punishment for

Turkey~

?urkey should have

been driven out of Europe, they thought.
Under such very unfavorable conditione the
Treaty was expected to be enforced .

"

~evres

The Sultan's Govern-

ment would not ratify the treaty and the Nationalists utterly repudiated it.

None of the Powers were willing to under-

take the task directly.
enforce the peace terms.2

Unfortunately, Greece attempted to
She wa s not without some aid and

1. Statement of the Russian unofficial delegation at the
Paris Peace Conference, July 5, 1919, Miliukov, P.¥.,
Russia rr:oday and Tomorrow, p. ~8 ..
2. "Greece Attempts to Impose the Sevres Treaty," Current
History, XIV, :pp. 347-48, J-aay, 1921.
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encouragement, however, for Britain supported Greece in
her

attempt~

Despite Englandts help, Greece was in no way

prepared for the undertaking.
France and Italy . deaerted Great Britain at about this
time, turning to the aid of Tur~ey~l

With the many jeal-

ousies dividing the Powers, the need for a complete revision
of the s'evres settlement was readily recognised.
London Conference on Near :Eastern Affairs

d~ring

At the
the early

months of 1921, a provisional program was drawn up whereby
a revision of the peace terms might be acoomplished.

The

Supreme Council invited Greece, and the two groups2· in
Turkey to the parleys.3

The two Turkish delegations, each

with practically the same instructions, came to the Conference well prepared to defend the interests of their State.4

The

proposals which were finally made by the Supreme

Council w.i th a view toward modification of the treaty were
published in a British statement issued on March 12, 1921,
saying in effect that the Allies would pledge their Governments to aid Turkey in gaining admission to the League
of Nations, as soon as Turkey gave proof of her readiness
to carry out the modified treaty.5

The Allies agreed to

1. See infra, p. 47~
2. The Sultants Government at Constantinople and the Nationalist Government at Angora.
3. The London Conference met from February 21, to March 12,
1921. "Revising the Turkish Treaty," Current History,
XIV, p .. 176, April, 1921.
4. Ibid~, u. 178.
'\
5. "Greece-Attempts to Impose the Sevres Treaty," Cur. Hist .. ,
XIV, p .. 348.
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withdraw the threat of Turkish expulsion. from Constantin-

ople; to give to Turkey the chairmanship of the Straits
Commission, to give her two votes instead of one in the
Commission; and to allow Turkey to increase her gendarmerie.l
The Powers would be willing to reduce the demilitarized
zones more in keeping with the Turkish desires.

These mod-

ified zones would include the Gallipoli Penninsula, and the
coast of Marmora up to Rodosto; on the Asiatic coast of' the
Dardanelles, from Karabigha on the Sea of Marmor a to a
point on the Aegean Sea neer the island of Tenedos; on the
two shores of the Bosphoru.s to a depth of from 121t to 16
miles inland; and the islands commanding . the entrance to
the Dardanelles in the Aegean and Marmora Seas ,2 Furthermore, the Allies would also consider the evacuation of
Constantinople and the Ismid Penninsula, thus limiting the
inter-allied occupation to the Gallipoli Penninsula and to
Chanak.3

The maintenance of Turkish troops in Constantin-

ople and uninteri'upted pass age of Turkish t roops ov er the
demilitarized e.reas at the Bosphorus was conceded. 4

Certain

financia.l s.nd territorial concessions would be considered
also,5

Greece was to continue to maintain a garrison in

Smyrna.6
1. Ibid., P• 348. ·
2. IDIU., P• 348. See map, Appendix III. Compare these
-zones with those of the s'evre s and Lausanne set t lements.
3. Ibid., p. 348.
4. Ibid., P• 348.
5. Ibid., p. 348.
6, IbiQ., p. 348.
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Turkey accepted all of the proposed modifications except the one dealing with the continuance of the Greek
garrison in Smyrna.

Greece, on the other hand, rejected

the proposa.l s in toto .1
On the twenty-four t h of Me.rch 1921, Greece initiated
a vigorous drive age.inst the Natione.list forces in Anatolie_
in an e.ttempt to force the 'l1r eaty of s·evx•es upon Turkey. 2
The chances for Greek success, were prejudiced, hov1ever,
before the Greek army be g an its offensive,

F're.nce and

Italy had already openly sympathized with Turkey in her
attempt to secure modification of the peace terms, and by
the middle of March both Italy and France had signed treaties
of peace with Turkey,3
The very day on which the Allied Powers had submitted
the proposed modifications to Turkey, Italy and Turkey
signed a peace treaty wherein the Government of Italy pledged
itself '' ••• to sup port effectively in relations to its Allies
all demands of the Turkish delegation relative to the Peace
Treaty, and especially restitution to Turkey of Smyrna and
Thrace. 11 4
The treaty between France end Turkey wa.s more general
in its terms than the Italo-Turkish convention, the former
1. Ibid., p. 347.
2. Ibid., P• 347.
3. Montgomery, G.R., "Secret Pacts of F'rance and Italy With
Turkey," Current History, XIV, p. 203, May, 1921.
Contains texts.
4. Ibid • , p • 20 5 .
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being a

11

general" peace tre aty between tbe two countries.

As a result of the treaty several thousand Nationalist
troops were released from the Cilician front, which France
had been defending , and transferred without delay to the
Graeco-Turkish lines , l
Because of the actions of France and Italy the
tion within the Entente

bec~e

very critical.

situ~

Gre a t Bri-

tain was opp osed by Fr ance and Italy with regard to the
"Near Eastern" question,2 and mutual jealousies had arisen
between France and Great Britain in. Europe in l'espect to
the German and Polish settlements. 3 Turk ey, running true
to form, used the European quarrels to f.u:rther her own
ends,

With France and Ita:ly avowedly sympathetic with the

Turkish cause, and definitely lending their aid to Turkey,
Greece was impotent, especially since Great Britain gave
nothing more than "moral support 11 to the Greek cause,
Under these distressing circmnstances the Greek campaign in Asia Minor wa s doomed to failure, and added to
the advante.g e gained by a rift in the Entente, an invasion
of the Turkish homel and by Greece made it all the more
1. Ibid., p. 203-204.
2. Simonds, F.H., "Anglo-French Dis putes," American Review
of Reviews, . LXIV, p. 259.
3. IbN., p. 260- 261. A full discussion of' these conflict---rn:g Imp erialistic policies is out of place in this
paper; the accounts in the periodicals of that period
are quite interesting . See especially, Simonds, F.H.,
.£12.• cit., pp. 259-267, and Gibbons, H.A., 11 F'reedom of
the Straits," Asia, XXII, pp. 994-98.
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certain that Greece would have to capi tula.te in Asia Minor.
However, these conditions, two Allied note s , and some
Gre ek reverses, could not deter Constantine from planning
a bold stroke calcul a ted to restore srnne of Greece's lost
prestig e.

According to his program, Smyrna wa s to be de-

clared an autonomous State under Greek protec t ion, this was
to be followed by a march on Constantinople with the aim
in view of Greek occupation of thD.t city.l
The Allies promptly forbade the carrying out of this
plan in the same fash ion that an e arlier attempt to blockade the Straits by Greece was opposed.2

The continued

opposition of the Allie s to the Greek plans undoubtedly
affected the fin al outcome of the "Near Eastern" question,
at the same time this opp osition served as a good alibi for
the Greek reverses in Asia l~inor. 3
For about a year the situation remained virtually unchanged in Anatolia except for a short period of Greek
successes, wherein the Greek troop s threatened the Nationaliststcapital, Angora.

However, during the last we ek of

August, 1922 , the Kemalists started a surprise attack on
the Greek lines concentrating on the we akest point, along
the Afiun-Karahissa r front.4

An overwhelming victory for

1. Polyzoides, A.T., "The Greek Collapse in Asia Minor,"
Current History, XVII, p. 33, October, 192 2 ~
2. "Greece in New Difficulties," Current Histor;z:, XIV,
p. 518, June, 1921.
3. Polyzoide s , A.T., ~· cit., pp. 35-36.
4. "The Turkish Triumph Over Greece," Current History,
XVII, p. 161, October, 19 22 .

50

the Turkish forces resulted.

The Greek army and civilian

population fled before the Turkish advance, fearing a
massacre.

The drive continued on towards Smyrna, which

city was occupied by the Nationalists, September 9.1

On

the previous day the city had been turned over to the Allied
authorities by the Greeks.
The Greeks made

f~antic

appeals to the A1liee, oalling

for an armistice, for Greece was in danger of loa1Pg all
that she possessed in Aaia Minor and possibly in

An armistice at this time was oompletely out of

Tn~$Oe,2
~he

of possibility on account of the Turkish e.ttituqe,

range
Turkey,

now flushed with success, would not listen to any terms
which would leave Greece in Asia Minor or Thrace,3

Turkey

had the support of France and Italy in this respect.
Since an armistice was evidently impossible, the Greek
rout continued, and the Greek forces fled across into Thrace,
which was still held by the Athens Government,

An extremely

critical situation arose e.t this · point, for the Kemalist
forces were determined to cross the neutralized zones of
the Straits in pursuit of the Greek army, which the Nationalists hoped to drive out of Thrace.

The regaining of this

territory was one of the pledges contained in the Turkish
National Pact of 1920.4

But Great Bri tedn was just as

1. Ibid., P• 161.
2. Ibid., p. 161.
3. 'lrTfie New Turkish Crisis", Curren1?,_ ~_!._story, XVII, p. 184,
November, 1922.
4. Text in Current History, XVII, pp. 280-281.
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determined to prevent any violation of these neutral zones;
if necessary force would be used to preserve the neutrality
of the Straits .1
France, backed by Bulgaria and Rumania tried to dissuade Britain from using force to prevent the pursuing Kemalists from crossing the Straits.

The French suggestion

was that only diplomatic means should be used.2
In the meantime the Greeks in Thre.ce prepared to defend their rights under the Treaty of Sevres by amassing
men and material in that region,

Turkey, atill preparing

to follow the Greeks, be g an to close in on the British
forces, which were concentrated at Chanak near the entrance
of the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side.3

Higply incensed

at the British attitude, the Nationalists oondenmed England because of her interference in Turkey. claiming that
the so-called "neutralization" of the Straits was nothing
less than British contro1,4

But Great Britain was not to

be shaken by Turkish threats, and on September 15, the British Government with French approval informed Kemal that
the neutrality of the Straits must be respected.5

In res-

ponse Mustapha. Kemal declared that the Allies should pledge
themselves to the return of Thrace to Turkey.

Nationalist

troops were then concentrated at Ismid on the extreme eastern
1. "The New Turkish Crisis", Cur. Hist., XVII, P• 184.
3. --r5id7;I:}. 184.
2. Ibid., p. 184.
4. ~., p. 184.
5. Ibid., p. 184.
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end of the Marmora, while a Turkish force continued to advance toward the British entrenchment at Chanak.

The send-

/

ing of Gener e.l PelJ.e, the French High Conunissioner to Smyrna
in order to try and influence Kemal to adopt a more modera.te
policy failed of its purp ose.l
In Ene;land, Lloyd George prepared and sent a note to
Rumania, Jug oslavia, and Greece calling on them to aid
Gre a t Britain in
the Straits.

he~

t ask of pre s erving the. neutrality of

The same appe al was made to the British do-

minion s , which evinced more enthusiasm,
the Straits, ran the st atement

''~

Th.e protection of

•• involved not only Bri-

tish interests, but European interests in gener-al, and
world interest s of the first order.

The permanent freedom

of the Straits, ••• was a vital neriessity.

If that were

given up ••• all the r e sults of the victory over 1'urkey in
the World War would have been destroyed."2

In support of

this attitude the entire British Atlantic fleet was dispatched to the Dardanelles to aid the English force at
Chanak, which was also reinfo"rced with additional troops
and heavy artillery, preparatory to me e ting the 'J.urkish
advance.3
In the meantime, Lord Curzon had gone to Paris in an
attempt to secu:r·e French approval for the British program.
1. Ibid., p. 184.

2. Paraphrase of the British official stat ement,
185.

3. Ibid., p. 185.

ibi~.,

p.
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But, on September 19, Premier Poincare, with the cabinet's
backing , advised the British to withdraw from Chanak,

In

return fo1• this concession, e.ccording to the French plan,
Kemal was to give a guarantee not to attack the neutral
zones~

Furthermore, France, Italy, and Great Britain were

to consent to the return of Thrace to Turkey; and Kemal was
to consent to the continued freedom of the Straits, giving
assurances in this respect.

Turkey was also to consent to

the establishment of an international
for the Straits,!

comm~ssion

of _control

But when it was learned that Turkey de-

manded an immedia t e evacuation of Thrace before terms would
be considered, the inter-Allied conference adjourned without coming to an agreement, and on September 21, the British
Government categorically refused to withdraw her troops
from Chanak, even though the F'rench and Italian troops had
been withdrawn from the zone,2

General Harrington, Bri-

tish commander of the Allied forces, assured Turkey that
England did not want war with Turkey, but to no avail, for
the Nationalist forces continued to close in on the British
at Cha_nak. 3
On September 23, the British succeeded in reuniting
the Entente on a single program of activities in the Near
East.

Fre.nce and Ite.ly, finally realizing the seriousness

of the situation, created partly by their efforts, agreed
1. Ibid., p. 186.
3. Ibid., p. 186.

2. Ibid., p. 186.

54
to the sending of a joint note with Britain to Mustapha
•
1
Kemal.
The Powers invited Turkey to send delegates to a
peace conference to conclude · a final peace with the Allies.
They made known their assent to the reestablishment of
Turkey in Thrace as far as the Maritza river, including
Adrianople.

"On condition that the Angora Government does

not send armies during the peace negotiationa into zones,
the provisional neutrality or which has been proola:l.med by
the Allied Governments, the three Governments will willingly
support at the Conference attribution of these frontiers to
Turkey, it being understood that steps will be taken in
common agreement in the t reaty to safeguard the interests
of Turkey and her neighbors, to demilitarize, with a view
to the maintenance of peace in certain zones to be fixed,
to obtain peaceful, and orderly re-establishment of Turkey's
authority, and finally to assume effectively, under the
League of Nations maintenance of the freedom of the Dardan"
elles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus, as well as protection of religious and racial minorities."
The Allies are in agreement " ••• in reaffirming their
assurance ••• that they will withdraw their troops from Constantinople as soon as the treaty of peace has entered into
force."
"The three Allied Governments will use their influence
to procure before the opening of the conference the retirement
1. Ibid., p. 186.
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of the Greek forces to a line to be fixed by the Allied
Generals in agreement with the Greek and Turkish military
authorities.•
"In return for this intervention the Government of
Angora will undertake not to send troops, either before
or during the peace conference, into the zones of neutrality which have been previously declared and not to cross
the Straits or the Sea of Marrno:ra. 111
The results of this Conference were very important,
chiefly because Entente unity had been

ac~ieved..

Turkey·' s

strongest weapon, division and jea lousy among th.e Powers,
vvas removed.

The crisis had not been passed, however, for

the Turks continued to advance toward the British stronghold at Chanak.

General Harrington demanded the withdrawal

of the Kemalist troops from the zones and on September 29,
Turkey refused to quit that area.2

The two opposing forces

Ylere separated by about ten miles and 'both were prepared
for conflict when the Nationalist reply to the Allied joint
note of September 23, was received on October 3.
The Turks accepted the proposals for an armistice and
peace conference on condition that Constantinople and Thrace
be ceded to Turkey.

Turkey for her part would consent to
/

the establishment of some sort of a satisfactory regime of
1. Joint note from the Allied Governments to Turkey, September 23, 1922, text in Current History, ibid., p.
187.
~.

Ibid~,

p. 188.

. . . ..
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the Straits.

In this respect, however, Russia must be

allowed to state her views. 1
The Nationalist forces were then withdrawn and all
further military movements were suspended, and the situation was somewhat relieved.

On October 5, the Armistice

meeting began and the negotiatio11s continued until the
eleventh of the month when an ag reement was reached.

The

Armistice of Mudania provided for the evacuation of Thrace
by Greece within thirty days.
the territory.

Turkey lvas then to occupy

The Angora Government promised to withdraw

all Turkish troops from the zone of Allied occupation, and
new neutral zones in the Chanak a nd Ismid areas were to be
defined by a mixed commission.

The Allies would bring in

no new forces, and would not construct fortifications on
the Straits.

The Turks agreed to respect the neutral zone

until the Allied withdrawal.

The Angora Government bound

itself not to transport troops into Eastern Thrace nor to
raise or maintain an army there until the final ratification of the pea ce terms. 2
As many of the terms of the armistice as were possible
of execution at the time were carried out.

On October

26~

invitations to a peace conference to convene at Lausanne,
Switzerland, November 13, were issued by France, Italy and
1. Paraphrase of the Turkish reply,

ibid~, p. 188-89.
2.• Paraphrase of the Mudania Armistice, signed. October 11,
1922,. "The New Turkish Crisis," Current 1{istory, XVII,
pp. 192, November, 1922.
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Great Britain to the United St a tes, Greece, Rumania, Jug oslavi D. , Japan and the two Governments in Turkey.l

Russia ,

a nd Bulgaria were invited to send re presentatives to discuss the Straits problem o'nly .2
New developments a rose when announcement was ma de, on
November 1 ,. of the
ment.

/

/

deche~.

of the Sult a n a nd his Govern-

In place 6f the Const a ntino ple Government the People's

a nd Peasants' Government was proclaimed the sovereign power
in Turkey with authority vested in the Nati9nal fH113en1bly
at

The authority of the Sult an 's G9vernment wa s

Angora~

re pudia ted.3

In a note tendered to the French Foreign

Office November 3, all treaties neg otiated by the Government

e~ t

Const a ntinople since

a nd officia lly re pudiated.4

Iv~ rch

16, 1920, were forma lly

This of course included the

Trea ty of Sevres.
On November 5,

19 ;_~ 2,

the Nationalists took over the

city of Consta ntino ple a nd ordered the Allied troops to
eva cua te the city; to g ive up the control of the customs,
of the police force and of the r a ilways; e.nd to abolish the
mixed courts.

They dema nded tha t only one. Allied ship be

allowed to enter a ny Turkish port within the Straits a t
one time.

Other demands making for increa sed Turkish

1. The Sultan's Government at Constantinople and the Angora

Government·-

2. "Turkey," Current History, XVII, p .. 521, December, 1922.
3. Ibid., P• 521.
4. "Angora Ends Sultanate," Current History, XVII, 461,
December, 1922.

,......... .
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sovereignty in the city were made.l
The Allied Governments had no other recourse than to
recognise the fait

~ccompli~

But, although they realized

that the Angora Government was supreme in Turkey, the Allied
Commissioners refused to comply with the Nationalist demands, being supported by their respective Governments in
tf!,is regard.2
It might be

aEA.;I.d,

in ps.sDins that the

Turk~~h

lfa.t;ion-

alist movement which beg an in 1goa had at last achieved
s~ccess.

Furtherrnor~ the obnoxious Treaty of S~vrea which

whittled away most Of the Ottoman Empire wae abrogated and
a

new Turkey representing the people was ready to negotiate

terms of peace on a basis of equality.
During this very critical period the neutrality of the
Straits was menaced on several occasions.

It was through

the efforts of Great Britain mainly that their neutral
status was successfully maintained.

There may have been

an opportunity for England to have remained on the Straits
nnd in Constantinople as she has at Gibraltar, but she was
true

to

her pledge of seeking only to secure the freedom of

navigation of the Straits under international guarantees.
The Lausanne Conference was called for November 13,
but because of the disagreement between the Allies the
1 •. "Turkey," Cur. Hist., XVII, p .. 521 •.
2. Ibid., p. 522.

..
'
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sessions did not open until the twentieth of the month.
At the insistence of Great Britain, the Allies first met
among themselves and arrived at a common agreement before
the official sessions began.

In this manner, they were

able to present a united front on the main problems involved.
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CHAPTER IV
The Tres.ty of Lausanne and the Straits

The Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern affairs began
its labors in the afternoon of November 20, 1922.

The

countries represented were; the three inviting Powers,
England, France, and Italy; Japan, Rumania, Jugoslavia, .

Kingdom of

Serbs - ~Oro~ta

and Slovenes,

I

Grt~Qe

and Turkey,

Russia Ukraine, Georgia, and Bulgaria were in attendance
only for the discussions relating to the Straits,

The

United Ste.te s was represented by an "unofficial qbeerver 11 1
the Government being unwilling to enter into the work of
the Conference offiaie.l:iy.
The problems to be settled were many, varied and of
undoubted difficulty,

It is no wonder that the Conference

failed once, before it finally finished its task of bring"
ing peace to the Near East,
In dealing with the work of the Conference only the

outstanding proposals, counter-proposals and objections
will be considered before taking up the actual settlement.
In general there were two opposing views presented and
maintained throughout the negotiations.

Strangely enough

these two views were held by Great Britain on the one hand,
and by Russia on the other.

Since 1914 each of these two

Powers had witnessed a complete reve r sal of policy in respeat to their interests on the Straits. , It will be remembered,
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that prior to the Russian revolutions in 1917, the attitude
of Russia had been for an opening of the Straits to warships, especially her own.

Great Britain, on the other

hand, had by dint of much labor, successfully opposed Russian aims in this direction by bolstering up the weak govermnent of the Sultan from time to time throughout the
nineteenth end early part of the twentieth century.

England

had continually insisted upon the rule of closure of the
Straits to all warShips,
During the World War, however, Great Britain learned
just exactly what the closure of' the Straits really meant,
for in this instance, it cut off the valuable Shipments of
foodstuffs from Russia that were so necessary to English
existence,

England then, was prepared to keep the Straits

free and open at all times in peace and in war, so that
there would be no danger of a calamity, such as the stopping
of all trade through the Straits, being repeated,
Russie. on the other hand, since the change of Government from that of the Czar to that of the Proletariat, was
ready to shut off all warships from coming into the Black
Sea where they might menace her frontier.

The proletarian

Government of Russia had a super sensitiveness regarding
foreign affairs.

Wherever the Russian representatives went

they feared capitalistic imperialism, which they believed
was pressing in on them from all sides.

Under these circum-

stances it is little wonder that Russia was determined to

l
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keep the Black Sea free from foreign warships.
The other Powers of · V/estern Europe were just as frightened by the

words~

"World Revolution" as Russia was afraid

of the word "Imperialism".

Consequently there was a feel-

ing of mutual distrust of each otherts motives when the
Conference began.

In general the Powers aligned themselves

in this fashion; Russia at the extreme left, Turkey in the
center, and England and the other Powers at the

extr,~e

right ...
The question might be asked why did the other littoral
Statee of the Black Sea area follow the . lead of the Allies
instead of following that of Russia?

Would they not gain

more by leaving the Black Sea free from foreign warships?
They thought tha t Russia's renuncie.tion of imperialistic
tendencies was merely a gesture.

Even if it were not, the

doctrine of world revolution was just as
warships were excluded from the

Stra~ts

odious~

If foreign

and the Black Sea,

these riverain States would be liable to the complete domination of Russia, whom they fenred.
As for Turkey, it was clear that she favored the Russian viewpoint, but owing to Allied pressure during the
days following the

war~

Turkey had been forced, on many

occasions, to accept the principle of freedom of the Straits,
with the resulting restrictions of her sovereignty.

In

consequence of her numerous pledges to respect this principle in return for Allied concessions, Turkey was in no
position to renounce her committments.
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Proposals Reg~rding the Regime of the Straits
~

The general terms of the Allies' proposals fell under
two heads;

"(1) regulations for the passage of vessels,

whether of peace or war, through the Straits; (2) the creation of demilitari~ed zones on the shores of the Straits ••• nl
In framing the proposals, the Allies had as their objectives the permanent factors involved in the problem.
These factors may thus be described:
''1. The primary interest in theae waters fpom the point
of view both of economic life and security against attack,
of the littoral States of the Black Sea, both great and
small, e,nd the necessity of giving equal consideration to
the interests of all those States.
11

2. The character of the Dardl..'melles, the Sea of 1\l!ar ..
mora and the Bosphorus, e.s an international highway for the
commerce of the world between two international seas, and
the necessity, therefore, of treating it, as far as possible,
in the same manner as other international waterways, whether,
rivers, Straits or canals, with a view to assure the freedom of peaceful commerce.

3. The existence of the Capital of Turkey and th~
seat of the Caliphate on the shores of this waterway."
11

In order to realize these principles the Allies proposed the following rules for navigation of the Straits:
"1. As regards ships o:( .9.9_l1J!!Lerce, there will be complete freedom of navigation whatev~r the flag and the cargo.~.
in time of peace, and in time of war, when Turkey is neutral.
In time of war, when Turkey is belligerent there shall be
complete freedom of navigation for neutral vessels, provided no assistance is given to the enemies of Turkey.

1. Lord Curzon, President of the Territorial and Military
Commission December 6, 1922, Lausanne Conference on

Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-1923, Records ,Pf Proceedings
and Draft Terms !Jf Peace, p. 134. Hereafter referred
to as Proceedings.
2. Lord Curzon, December 6, Proce..§..dings, p. 141-142.
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••• The means taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships from
using the Straits shall not be of such a nature as to interfere vdth the free passage of neutral vessels,
"2 .• !,!! regards sh.i£S
shall be complete freedom
ject to limi te.tion on the
the warships of one power

of ~~ in time of peace there
of passage for all flags ••• subnumber and duration of stay of
in a Turkish port.

"In time of war when Turkey is neutral there shall
be complete freedom of passage for warships as in time of
peace.
"In time of war, when Turkey is belligerent there
shall be freedom of pas sage for neutral ships onl y. 11 ·
II

It has otten been stated that the

de~ire

ot the

Western Powers is to imp ose upon Turkey aome euob solution
as would leave the Capital of the Turkish State &t the
mercy of a hostile fleet."l

However, this. was a false

ob serve.tion.
Under the Allied proposals Turkey was to retain the
right to prevent belligerent warships from entering the
Straits When Turkey was at war.
were to be permitted to pass.

Only neutral warships
Further, the freedom of

passage for commercial vessels durins wartime in which
Turkey was belligerent would be slightly restricted, the
right of visit and search being retained for Turkey, in
order to prevent the transportation of troops or contraband. 2

"Finally, in the event of a war in which Turkey

herself is neutral, the Allied Powers agree to the imposition upon belligerent warships of the conditions and
1. Lord Curzon, Second Meeting of the Straits Commission,
December 6, 1922 , Proceedings, p. 142.
2. Ibid., p. 142.
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restrictions defined in the thirteenth Hague Convention of
1907 regarding maritime neutrality."!
"Iri order to ensure the due carrying out of the above
rules, the Allies propose (1) that certain zones to be
fi~ed on the European and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles
and Bosphorus sha.ll be effectively demilitarized; (2) that
an international commission shall be set up with the necessary technical services both to provide for the buoying,
lighting, quarantine defense of the waters," of the Straits,
"and to supervise and inspect the demilitarization of the
land zones."~
Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Jugoslavia, the Serbs-Croate
and Slovenes, Japan,

~nd

the United States found themselves

in close agreement with the Allied proposals..

Their views

were stated in timely speeches, delivered to the Commission
at various steps during the proceedings.

Some of the talks

were quite eloquent in their appeals to the consideration
of world interests.

However, each delegation made certain

that their own nation was vitally concerned with the final
disposition of the Straits.

Turkey and Russia, especially,

remained unconvinced of the justice of the Allied proposals,
despite Lord Curzonts expositions.
Turkey in expressing her desires stated that the
Straits and Constantinople must be preserved against possible surprise a.ttacks.

The only advisable method of

protection against surprise attacks would be by means of
fortifications and adequate defenses.

In this way only

1 .. I,ord Curzon~ Second Meeting of the Straits Commission,.
December 6, 1922, Proce.edings, p. 142 .. See J. B ..
Scott, The Hague Conventions of 1898 ~ 1907, p .. 209.
2 .. Pro c_eeding s, p. 143.
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could Turkey defend her shores and city should some Power
threaten her or the freedom of the Straits.l
"Once these districts are secured against surprise
attack, any State which viol a ted its international engage- ·
ments would have no chance of gaining an immediate victory,
and the Powers would be enabled to take such measures as
the circumstances required. 11 1
In other words, Turkey would be responsible for her
own safety and the Powe:rs would have the f re edom of the
Straits insured, both 'by their own e.ctions e,nd by the a.'-d
of Turkey.

In accordanc e with these considerations, Turkey

set forth the bases of h$r program, which She wiShed to
establish; they were as follows:
11

(1) A guarantee securing the Straits, Constantinople
and the Sea. of Marmora against surprise attack by land or
sea.
11

{2) Limitation of the naval forces which may enter
the Black Sea, so they shall not constitute a. danger for
the districts between the two Straits and in the Black
Sea.
11

(3) The freedom of passage both in war and peace for
merchantmen; in case Turkey is a belligerent she will be
satisfied with such technical control as is indispensible. 11 2
Turkey, then, agreed with the Allies that there should
be same sort of demilitarized zone, provided means could
be found to assure her of adequate protection for her
interests and territory.

She accepted the principle of

the creation of a Commission for the regulation of the
1. Ismet Pasha, head of the Turkish Delegation, third meeting of the Straits Commission, December 8, 1922,
Proceedings, p. 158.
2. Proceedings, p. 158.
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navigation of the Straits.

Finally, she accepted without

qualification the principle of freedom of passage for merchant vessels.
However, Turkey did have certain specific objections
to the Allied proposals which may be outlined as follows:
(1) The Sea of Marmora should not be included in the
"Straits 11 since fortj.f'ications on 1 ts snores are necessary
for the defence of Anatolia and Thrace.l
(2) It is useless to create a demi~itarized ~one ~
round Constantinople since a railway line serves as an
important connection between Anatolia and Thrace, and since
Constantinople possesses a garrison,
cient to

11

.,

It should be suffi-

,indicate that there should be no land or sea

fortifications on either shore. nl
(3) The movement of troops within the demilitarized
areas must be allowed because the zones connect Anatolia
and Thrace,l
(4) Turkey must be allowed to maintain arsenals and
other naval establishments at Constantinople in order to
defend the shores of the Sea of Marmora by fleet,l
11

(5) The area of the demilitarized zones is too ex-

tensive." 1
. (6) The three islands of Imbros, Tenedos, Samothrace

must be given to Turkey, and Lemnos must be declared
1. Proceedings, pp. 158-159.
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autonomous .. l
(7) A minimwn means of defense should be permitted
on the Gallipoli peninsula to protect it against surprise
attack.l·
The Allies in replying to these objections refused
to admit the possibility of extracting the
from the term ttthe Straits".
passageway they

claim~d,

This we.e

El.

Se~

or Marmora

vi t$1 part of the

a.nd the ability to l?revent free

pe.es age in that Sea meant the possibility · of hindering of
t?e passage through the two outlets.

The adequate defense

of the ports and railheads on the shores of the Marmora. could
be provided without removing the Sea from the "Straits".
Ae for the demilitarized zones on the Boephorus, the Allies
considered that they should 'be mainta ined, but that the
movement of troupe across the zones might be allowed, provided, of course, that the troops were in transit.

As for

the maintenance of arsenals at Constantinople there was no
dis agreem~nt

in principle.

The Allies could

no~

see wherein

the zones were too large, nor could they agree that the
sovereignty of Lemnos or Samothrace could be transferred
from Greece.

As for the last objection, the Allies could

not agree with the Turkish demands, for they considered
that by placing Kavak outside the demilitarized zone Turkey
1. Proceedings, pp.

158-159~

,.......
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could maintain a force of sufficient size there for the
pro t ection of the peninsula.

FUl~therm ore,

Turkey would

be permitted to retain on the peninsula a gendarmerie to
preserve Ol"der.l

The Allies considered that these provi-

--

sions should satisfy Turkey's request for "un minimum de
moyens ~defense,"

-

As the discussions continued in the sessions of the
'rerri torial and Military Commission, the Turkish delegati on
brought itself into closer harmony with the Allied views,
Quite early she repudiated

~he

Russian viewpoint concerning

.•

the proposed reglement and accepted. the Allied proposals
in general,2

'lbere were certe.in demands, however, that

Turkey continued to press, which delayed the final settlement,

She insisted that a force should be allowed on the

Gallipoli peninsula; that the Turkish forces should not be

.

limited in any way outside the zones and that e.dequate
guarantees for the security of the Sea of Marmora and Con ...
stantinople should be given.

In respect to this last point

Turkey submitted a formula for providing political guarantees to her city and the Marmora shore.3

Objections con-

tinued to be made concerning the proposed Commission of the
Straits on the grounds that by allowing the Conunission to
1. Proceedings' p. 169 and p. 285.
2. fsmet Pasha, Third Meeting of the Straits Commission,
·December 8, Proceedings, pp. 156-158.
3. Ismet Pasha, Sixth Meeting of the Straits Commission,
December 19, 1922, Proceedings, pp. 270-271.

?0

supervise the

demilite~ization

of the zones the sovereignty

of Turkey would be impaired.l
The Allies, however, would not make any further concessions despite further pleas and demands.

Finally on

February 4, 1923, the Turkish delegation accepted the proposals of the Allies respecting the Straits.
"We have abandoned the principle of the closing of
the Straits, a principle which, as has been proved by past
experience, is hi~tor:tc~lly that which most adequately
secures the safety or our capital, and we have ag~eed that
the waters of the Straits shall be open to the ships of
all nations. Pu:rthe:r, in spite of the t'aot that ln ·maP.y
cases where both shores of an open-waterway belong~ng to a
single Power, that Power retains by usage the right of
fortification, we have agreed in the present instance to
demilitarization,
"We have also abandoned our request regarding the
maintenance of a garrison in the Gallipoli peninsula."2
The work of the Conference had come to an end but
still the Turkish delegation refused to sign the treaty
because of certain economic and judicial proposals.

The

Conference failed on February 4, 1923, despite the efforts
of all concerned to reach an agreement.

The results of

the Conference were not cast out but retained pending
future negotia.tions, which all expected to come a few
months later.

1. Irunet Pasha, Seventh Meeting of the Straits Commission,
December 20, Proceedin~s, p. 286.
2. Memorandum presented bysmet Pasha to the Presidents
of the British, French and Italian delegations, Lausanne,
February 4, 1923, Proceedings, p. 838.
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The Russian Proposals for the Straits
In the meantime it would be well to examine the main
outlines of the Russian proposals regarding the establishment of the Straits' regime.

This subject has been pur-

posefullr reserved because at no time during the Conference
were the proposals made by Russia seriously considered as
possible of execution.

The Allies and the other

~epresent~

atives, including Turkey, e.lJ. he,d accepted tl.le pr1nciple
that the Straits should. be completely free from
strictions, while the Russians based their

al~ re~

proposal~

on an

entirely opposite viewpoint.
Following the Russian Revolutions of 1917 Russia

d~

veloped the idea that the Western Powers had imperialistic
designs on "free Russia."

In order to combat this peril,

she firmly believed that the only method of protection
from this area lay in erecting an impenetrable barrier between Russia and her enemies,

In much the srume fashion

that England had blocked the Russian advence toward the
Mediterranean before the war, the Russians now wished to
block the British advance towa.rd the Black Sea region.
It cannot be said that Russia was poorly represented
at the Conference, for such was not true, but the Soviet
delegation headed by M. Chicherin waged a losing battle
from the beginning; there being nine States solidly opposed
to the Russians.

Even Turkey, to whom the greatest advan-

tages would accrue under the Russian scheme, repudiated

...,...
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the Soviet proposals, for reasons already mentioned.l
Russia came to the Conference with two fundamental
principles to guide her in the discussions.

They were:

»(1) equality for Russia and her Allies with other Powers
as regards position and rights, a nd (2) the preservation of
peace and security in the territories of Russia and the
republics allied with her and freedom in their economic
rela tiona with other countries ."2

The permanent f reedom

for commercie,l navigation and for peacef1,tl maritiwe cQmmunications in the Straits must be insured absolutely and
wi t hout any restrictions.2

Lasting guarantees should be

provided for the maintenance of peace in the Black Sea,
and on its shores, »peace in the Near East and the security
ot Constantinople ••• " by closing the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus permanently to all warships, armed vessels and
military aircraft in peace time and in war time to all nations with the exception of Turkey. 3
To accomplish these objectives the sovereign rights
of the Turkish people must be recognized over all Turkish
territory a nd wa ters.

In order to defend the Straits

effectively against all possible' att a cks the Russi an Government insisted that the Turkish Government should be
1. Turkey was undoubtedly influenced on account of her
pledges given in the lJludros and JKudania armistices
to desert the Russian viewpoint which Turkey supported
at first. See Proceedin&s, p. 134, and above p. 69.
2. M. Chicherin, First Meeting of the Straits Commission,
December 4, 1922, Proceedings, p. 129.
3. M. Chicherin, ibid., p. 129.
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"··~fortify

given the express rig ht to

a nd arm its co a sts,

to possess a war fleet and to ap ply to the defence of the
Stra its a nd of the Sea of

~k~ rmor a

all the

technic ~ l

acces-

sori e s of modern wa rfa re."l
To

this thesi s the Russi c:m delegR.tion adhered consis-

tently throughou t the Conference, making but few minor
conces s ions.

Russia would a llow the Turkish Government

to permit entra nce of light wa re n ips wi t hin the Stra its
or the Black Sea for spe ci a l ca s e s a nd for specific
p oses, but this a ction would

h~ve

p~r

to be a pproved by the

Na tiona l Assembly.a
The Soviet propos a ls were ma de with a view towa rd
re ... establishing the same sort of a r eg ime over the Straits
tha t obtained prior to the wa r.3

The very status which

the Allies were a ttemp ting to a bolish wa s a dvocF.t.t ed openly
and strenuously by Russi a , but to no ava il, for the Allied
Powers would not trust the Turkish porter nor the Russi a n
protector of Turkey.

Turkey Accepts the Trea ty of La usanne
Following the abrupt ending of the Conference on
Februa ry 4, the va rious delega tions dispersed leaving the
1. M. Chicherin, ibid., p. 129.
2. The Rus s i a n Delegation's DrF.t. ft, Proceedings, pp. 250-253 ..
See al s o Appendix VI.
3. Compare the Russi a n Dra ft a nd the provisions of the
treaties of 1841, 1856 and 1871 in Appendices V & VI.
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Conference Secretariat at Lausanne in the hope that the
negotiations might subsequently be renewed.
About a month later the Angora Government made known
its refusal to accept the Lausanne treaty on the grounds
that the settlement was contrary to the spirit expressed
in the Turkish National Pact of 1920.

The opposition to

the treaty was ohie.f ly because of certain economio a,nd
financial measuree.l

On Maroh 8, 1923, Ismet Pasha direct-

ed notes to the varioue interested Governments stating the
attitude of the Angora Government concerning the treaty.
A Conference of the Allies gathered in London under
the presidency of Lord Curzon on 'March 21, to consider a
reply which would be sent to Angora.

After careful dis-

cussion of the Turkish counter-proposals a declaration was
drafted and approved.

Identic notes were sent by the Allies

to Angora, inviting Turkey to resume the negotiations at
Lausanne.

The invitation being acceptable, the Conference

began anew, April 22.

Discussion of the Straits question

was unnecessary since tha t Convention had already been
accepted by Turkey.2
On July 8, it was announced that agreement had been
reached on all of the outstanding points namely; the Ottoman Debt, "Concessions", and the problems regarding evacuation.

The following day a special cabinet meeting of

1 .. "Turkey,tt Current History, XVIII, p. 176, April, 1923 ..
2. See above p. 70.
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the Turkish Government met under Mustapha Kemal Pasha and
authorized Ismet Pasha to sign the Treaty as agreed upon
by the negotiators.1
In Lausanne, the entire text of the Treaty was reviewed July 17, and the signatures of the participants were
affixed to the documents, July 24, 1923, in the main hall
of the University of Lausanne.2

Jugoslavia refused to

sign the Treaty because of her objectione to the apportionment of the Ottoman de'bt •.
The Soviet Government informed the

Conf~reno~.

July 20,

that it was prepared to sign the Straits Convention.
August 14, 1923, M. Jordianski, Chief of the Russian
tion at Rome signed the Convention.3

On
delega~

On August 23, the

National Assembly ratified the Treaty, there being 215
affirmative votes cast out of 235 .. 4
Keeping their pledge, the Allies evacuated Constantinople, beginning at midnight of the

B8~e

day and complet-

ing the operation at noon October 2, 1923.5

The Convention of the Straits
The Treaty of Peace declares the principle of the
freedom of the Straits in Article 23 as follows:
1. tt.Signing of the Tre8,ty of Lausanne," Current History,
XVIII, p. 1049, September, 1923.
2. Ibid .. , p. 1049.
3. '*Russia," Current History, XIX, p. 173,. October, 1923 ..
4. "Turkey." Current History,. XIX, p. 176,. October, 1923 ..
5. Ibid., p. 173.
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"The high contracting parties are agreed to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and
navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in
time of war, in the strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of
Marmora and the Bosphorus, as prescribed in the separate
convention signed this day, regarding the regime of the
Straits. This convention will have the same force and
effect in so fe.r as the present high contracting parties
are concerned as if it formed part of the present treaty."l
The British Em.piz•e, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria,
Greece, Rumania., Russia., the Serb-Croat- Slovene State, and
Turkey " ••• being desirous of ensuring in the Straits free ...
dom of transit and navigation between . the Meditel:'ranean
Sea and the Black Sea for all nations in accordance with
the principle laid down in Article 23 of the Treaty ••• "
signed the Convention of the Straits providing for the new
regime for that passageway.
The signatories recognized and declared the principle
of freedom of transit and navigation by sea and · by air
in the Straits2, such transit being regulated by

with~

pro~isions

set forth in an annex to Article 2 of the Convention,3

For

merchant vessels and non-military aircraft during peace
time there was to be complete freedom of navigation and
passage, day or night, under any flag with any kind of cargo,
without any formalities, or ta.x or charge whatever unless
for services directly rendered.4

In time of war, Turkey

1. Article 23, Treaty With Turkey, signed July 24, 1923,
Great Britain Foreign Office~ Treaty Series 1923,
no. 16. (Treaty of Lausanne J.
2. Art. 1.
3. Art. 2.
4. Art. 2. Annex, l, a.

77
being neutral, there was to be complete freedom of navigation · under the srone conditions and Turkey's rights and
duties as a neutral cannot authorize her to ts.ke any measures which might interfere with the freedom of navige.tion
within the Straits .1

In time of vrar 1 Turkey being a bel-

ligerent, there was to be freedom of navigation for neutral
vessels and non-military aircraft 1f not assisting
by oarrying troops

o~

contraband, Turkey was to

right of visit and search,

The rights of

~Irkey

t~e

ret~in

en~my

the

to apply

to enemy vessels the measures allowed by 1ntern,atio:ru1l
le.w were not affected,

Furthermore 1 Turkey was to have

full power to take measures to prevent enemy vessels from
using the Straits, so long as those measures would not
hinder the free passage of neutral vessels,2
For warships, fleet auxilie.ries., troopships, aircraft
carriers, and military aircraft there was to be in peace
time complete

fr~edom

of passage, day or night under any

flag without any formalities, or tax, or charge but subject to restrictions as to total force as follows:

"The

maximum force which any one Power may send through the
Straits into the Black Sea is not to be greater than that
of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the
Blacl<: Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage;
but with the proviso that the Powers reserve to themselves

1. Art. 2. Annex, 1, b.

2. Art. 2. Annex, 1, c.

........
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the right to send ;tnto the Black Sea, at e.ll times and
under all circumstances, a force of not more than three
ships, of which no individual ship shall exceed 10,000
tons." 1

Turkey was relieved of all responsibility in re-

gard to the number of war vessels that should pass and
this duty was assigned to the Straits Commission, which
was to report twice each year to the League of Nations
regarding the forces within the Black See.,2 · In t~me of
war,

T~key

being neutral

the~e

was to be complete

of passage under the same conditions as li mted

f~eedom

abov~, 3

Wa.r sh;i.ps and military aircraft of belligerepts were !'or-

bidden to exercise any belligerent right within the Straits,
such as capture, visit and search etc,

Warships were to

be subject to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 dealing with maritime neutrality in regard to revictualling
and carrying out repairs, 4

In time of war, Turkey being e.

belligerent, there was to be complete freedom of ps.ssage
for neutral warships under the same conditions and limitations as in paragraph 2 (a),

But the means used by Turkey

to prevent the passage of enemy craft were not to be of
such a nature as would hinder the free passage of neutral
craft.5
1. Art. 2, Annex, 2, a.
2. Art. 2, Annex, 2, a.

These reports may be found published semi-annually in the Official Journal of the
League of Nations.
3. Art. 2, Annex 2, a.
4. See J. B. Scott, ££• cit., p. 209.
5. Art. 2, Annex, 2, c.
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Turkey could make such regulations as she saw fit
regarding the number of men-of-war and military aircraft
of any one Power which might visit Turkish ports or aerodromes at one time and the duration of stay.l

The Black

Sea littoral Powers were to enjoy the same rights in this
respect,2

Special sanitary ~e gulations were als o p~ovided.3

Demilitarized zones were outlined including

~ oth

the shores of the Dardanelles and the Bo ~ phorus. 4
zones were to be completely

demilitarize~,5

of

These

Turk.ey was to

be permitted, however, to maintain a garrison not to exceed
12,000 men in the

ne1~1brohood

defense of the cit¥.6

of Constantinople for the

Furthermore, Turkey was to retain

the right to trans port her armed forces through the demilitarized zones and islands of Turkish Territory as well
as through her territorial waters where the Turkish fleet
was to have the right to anchor,7 and Turkey was to retain
the right to move her fleet freely within Turkish waters,8
In order to carry out the provisions regulating the
passage of ships through the Straits,9 a Commission was to
be constituted at ConstantinoplelO comprised of a representative of Turkey who was to be president, and re presentatives
of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece,
1. Art.
3. Art.
4. Art.
5. Art.
6. Art.
8. Art.

2, Annex 5, a.
2, Annex 6,

4.

See map in Appendix.

6, and 7.

8.
17.

2. Art. 2, Annex, 5, b.

7. Art. 6.
9. Art. 14.

10. Art. 10.

·,

•··
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Ruma.n1e, Russia, and the Serb-Croat Slovene State in so
far as those States were signatories of' the Convention.l
Other littoral Powers of the Black Sea could, by signing
the Convention, possess the same right.l

The Commission

was to exercise its functions over the waters of the Straits,2
under the auspices of the League of Nations, to which it was
to address an annual report " ••• giving an aocount of its
activities, and furniShing all information which may be
useful in the interests of oonnne:rce and ne..vigation."3
The Powers agreed that should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized
zones be imperilled by violations of the provisions regard"
ing the freedom of passage, they would meet such violations,
or attacks, or threats of war by all means that the Council
of the League should determine for this purpose.

This was

agreed upon, on account of the danger that Turkey bore, because of the demilitarized zones,4

This provision gave a

sort of a political guarantee to Turkey.
These, in general, were the terms of the Convention
of the Straits as embodied in the rrreaty of Lausanne.

'rhe

other provisions of the treaty as well as of the Convention
were of such a nature that there was no question of their
enforcement.

By this Convention a new type of regime was

set up by the .F owers in accord with the more advanced
1. Art. 12.

2. Art. 11.

3. Art. 15.

4. Art. 18.
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principles of freedom for international maritime and air
navigation through international thoroughfares.

It had

taken almost an hundred yee.rs to secure freedom of navigation through the Straits for warships, and to provide
for the non-closing of the Straits during war time.

Dip-

lomatically, the task has been accomplished·, but the Convention of the Straits needs to be tested by war before
its value can be

reali~ed.

"Question of the Straits,"

Sinoe 1923 there has been no
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CONCLUSIONS

Such a problem as this does not easily admit solution.
It can not be thought that the "Question of the Straits" is
settled for all times to come, for the changing needs o:r
civilization, end the changing ideals and principles that
guide human organizations can not be successfully devined,
Each age must solve its own problems according to the needs
and exigencies of the time, being guided, of course, by its
ideals of justice and right,

At the present time we have

been guided by the principles of

intern a tionalizat~on,

Im"

portant highways of the sea and air are considered as too
valuable to be under the exclusive control of one nation,
consequently our international engagements tend to approximate the ideal of internationalization,

/

The "new regime of

the Straits" is the first realization in the case of an
important waterway where the principle of the "freedom of
the seas" has been applied,

Its guarantees are unique,

for they rest upon the mutual good will of the nations.
The Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, end Singapore are heavily
armed for protection, the Straits separating Europe and
Asia are completely

dise.rmed~

Which position is the most

adequately guaranteed1
No real estimate of the new regime can be given at
the present time, for this reason; during the past fifty
years peace-time commerce has not been hindered and the

8:3

test

or

any control over the Straits is not its effective-

ness in peace time but in war time.

Until a war comes Which

involves the Straits, our opinions concerning the regime .
must begin and end in speculation.

All that can be done is

to hope for the best in the future.

It must be remembered

in this connection that although Russia signed the Lausanne
settlement with regard to the Straits, she was not satisfied.
Wh~ther

Russia wil l continue to be silent 11 probl emati cal,

If the Western Powers do not display their

1~peri ~ list1o

tendencies in that direction, Russia will in all probability
remain quiet.

But Russia fears imperialism much a e the

Western Powers fear Bolshevism, and until her fee.re are
vanished the question will remain open,
The settlement had same

interesti~g

sidelights, chief

of which was the reversal of British and Russian policies
regarding the Straits.

Problems of international law were

revised and created which serve as interesting bits of
change found continually in this field.
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I

Commerce passing the Bosphorus during the years
1911-1913 inclusivel

Flag

Tonnage

Percen tage of Total
1 9 l3

1• English
2. Greek
3. Austro-Hungarian
4. Russian

I 5,370,781
I
I 1,958,201

s

•I 1,615,293
a 1,428,435

5, Turkish
6. German
7. French
8, Italian
9, Roumanian
10, Belgian
11. Norwegian
12. Dutch

906,416

s 3'7,5

••
••
:
I

733,600 :

••

••

••

••
••

••
••

42,3 I

4:3,5

••

16,4

11.3

I
I
I

11

10
6.3
5,1

:

a

15,3
9.7

:

6,4

5

I
I

4.1

3.8

:

3,7

3,3

I
I ,

3.3

6.5

:

I

':s
I

I

:

••
:
:

1911

1 ~ .7

:
••

I
I

191 2

.

••

572,730 ••
:
370,302 ••

••
4
:
:
2,6 ••

350 ,Y/3 ••

2.4 ••

1,9

1,6

295,038

2

1.6 :

1

2

:
199,034

6,2

I

:
288,203

••
3,8 :

:
••
••

:

••

1.4 ••

1,3

••
1.1 ••

1.6

1, Revue conunerciale du Leva.nt, XXVIII (1914), P• 300.
Quoted in Phillip s on-and Buxton, op. cit., pp. 232-233.
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II

Map showing· the entrance of the DarO.anelles prior to
the World We.r.

'l'he n'U.merous fo;rts represented hare were

demolished in accordance with the terms of tne Treaties of

s'evre s

a.n d Lausanne ,l

1. Taken from, The Dardanelles and _Their. -~~o~_'Y.:, by the
author of Tfle Real :Kaiser.-- ·· ·
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III

Map of Turkey in Europe showing the Zone of the Straits
\

as defined in the Treaty of' Sevres, signed Au.e;ust 10, 1920,1

1. Allied and Associated Powers, Treaty with Turkey, signed
at S~vres, France, August 10, 1920, British Foreign
Office, Treaty Series 1920.
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July 24 1 1923.1

1. Adapted from, Allied Powers, Treaty with Turkey, signed
at Lause.nne, Swi t z.erl enc1 , July 24, 1923, British Foreign Office, Treaty Series 19 23, no. 16.
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v
International Engagements Respecting
the Straits, 1807-19141

Treaty of Tilsit, July 7, 1807
Article II
11

As it h a.. s at all times been fo r bido.en for vessels
of war to enter into the canal of Co.n.st~tin o ple, that
is, into the Straits of the . Dard~nell.es aPd ~nto that
of the Black Sea, and ~m that ancient r~le of the Ott9man Empire shguld be obs erved henceforth in times of
peace with ref erence to any Powers whatsoeve~, the
Court of Brita~n promisee also to conform to this prin ..
oiple,"2
Treaty of Adrianople, September, 1829
Article VII
"Russian subjects shall enjoy; throughout the
whole extent of the Ottoman Empire, as well by land as
by sea, the full and entire freedom of trade secured to
them by the treaties concluded heretofore between the
two High Contracting Po~ers •• ,
"The Sublime Porte engages, moreover, to take
especial care tha.t th.e trade and navigation of the
Black Sea, · particularly, shall be impeded in no manner
whatsoever, For this purpose it admits and declares
the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that
of the Dardanelles to be entirely free and open to
Russia.n vessels under the merchant flag, laden or in
1. The portions of the treaties herein cited are offered

in order that a comparison may be made between the
status of the Straits prior to the World War and
following that war. Compare these citations vdth the
Russian Delegation's Draft. (Appendix VI)
2. Noradounghian, G., Recueil d 1 actes internationaux de 1'
Empire Ottoman (4 vols. 1~97-1903), II, p. 81, quoted
in Shotwell, J.T.
"A Short History of the Question of
Constantinople and the Straits." Documents of the
American Association for International ConciliatiOn
l922, no. 180, p. 497-:-- - -
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ballast, whether they come from the Black Sea for - the
purpose of entering the Mediterranean, or whether,
coming from the Mediterranean, they wish to enter the
Black Sea; such vessels, provided they be merchant
ships, whatever their size and tonnage, shall be exposed to no hindrance or annoyance of any kind, as
above provided,.. In virtue of the same principle
the passage of the Strait of Constantinople and that
of the Dardanelles is declared free and open to all
the merchant ships of Powers who are at peace with
the Sublime Porte, whether going into the Russian. ports
or the Black Sea or coming from them ••• upon the same
conditions which are stipulated for vessels under the
Russian flag.
'

"Lastly, the SUblime Porte, recognizing in tbe
Imperial . Court of Russie. the right of eecuri,ng the
necessary guarantees for this full treadom ot trade
and navigation in the Black Sea, ~eclares solemnly;
that on · its pQrt not the least obstacle Shall ever,
under any pretext whatsoever, be opposed to it. Above
all, it promises never to allow itself henceforth to
stop or detain vessels laden or in ballast, whether
Russian or belonging to nations with Wham the · Ottoman
Porte shall not be in a state of declared war, which
vessels shall be passing through the Strait of Con ...
stantinople and that of the Dardanelles, on their way
from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean, or from
the Mediterranean into the Russian ports of the Black
Sea,., nl
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833
Separate Secret Clause
" ••• The Sublime Ottoman Porte, in place of the
help which it is bound to furnish in case of need,
according to the principle of reciprocity in the open
treaty, Shall limit its action in favor of the Imperial
Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles, that is to say, not to permit any foreign shi~
of war to enter therein tmder any pretext whatever."

~., II, p. 166, quoted in Shotwell,
cit., pp. 499-50 2.
2. Noradounghian, £E• cit., II, p. 231, ibid., P• 503.

1. Noradounghian, £E•
~·
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Treaty of London, 1840
Article III
"If Mehemet Ali, a.fter having refused to submit
to the conditions of the arrangement above mentioned
(specified in a separate Act), should direct his land
or sea forces against Constantinople, the High Contracting Parties, upon the express demand of the .S ul ...
tan, addressed to their Representatives at Constantin~
ople, agree, in such case, to comply with the request
of that Sovereign, and to provide for the ~efence of
his throne oy means of a oooperation agreed upon by
mutual consent, for the purpose of placing the two
Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, ae well as
the capital or the Ottoman Empire, in security against
all agression •••
Article IV
"It is, however, expressly u,nderl;'ltood, that the
cooperation mentioned in t~e preceding Article, and
destined to place the Straits of the :Pa.rdan,elles and
of the Bosphorus, and the Ottoman cap~tal, vnder the
temporary safeguard of the High Contracting Parties
against all agression of Mehemet Ali, Shall be considered only as a measure of exception adopted at the
express demand of the Sultan, and solely for his defence in the single case above-mentioned; but it is
agreed that such measure shall not · derogate .in any ·
degree from the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire,
in virtue of which it has in all times been prohibited
for ships of war of foreign Powers to enter the Straits
of the Dardanelles and of· the Bosphorus. And the Sultan on the one hand, hereby declares that, excepting
the contingency above-mentioned, ·it is his firm resolu~
tion to maintain in future this principle invariably
established as the ancient rule of his Empire; and as
long as the Porte is at peace, to admit no foreign
ship of war into the Straits of the Bosphorus and of
the Dardanelles; on the other hand, their Majesties
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland, the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and
Bohemia, the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of all
the Russias, engage to respect this determination of
the Sultan(. and to conform to the above-mentioned
principle. '1
1. Parlia.mentary · Papers, LXXXIII, no. 43, p. 20, Shotwell,
~· cit., p. 507-509.
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The Convention of the Straits, 1841
Article I
nHis Highness the Sultan, on the one part, declares
that he is firmly resolved to mainte.in for the future
the principle invariably established as the ancient
rule of the Empire, and in virtue of which it has a.t
all times been prohibited for the Ships of War of Foreign
Powers to enter the Straits of the Dardanelles end the
Bospborus; and that so long as the Po~te is at peace,
His Highness will admit no Foreign Ship of War into the
said Straits,
·
nAnd their Majesties the Queen of,' the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Irelan~, the Emperor of Austria,
King of Uunga.ry and Bohemia., the King of the French,
· .
the King of Prussia, and the Emperor Qf all the Russias,
on the other part, ensa.gi to respect this det@rmina.tion
or the Sultan ~d to conform themselvQs to the principle
above declared,
Article II
nit is underetooO. that in reool•d:l,ng the :Lnviolabil·
ity of the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire mentioned
in the preceding Article, the Sultan reserves to himself, as in past times, to deliver Firmans of passage
for light Vessels under Flag of War, which shall be
employed as is usual in the service of the Missions of
Foreign Powers,
Article III
"His Highness, the Sultan, reserves to himself to
c~nmunicate the present Convention to all the Powers
with whom the Snblin1e Forte is in relations of friendship 1 inviting them to accede tliereto, "l

Treaty of Paris, 1856
"w~th reference to the Straits, a separate Convention between the six Powers (including Sardinia)
and the Sultan, signed the same time as the Treaty and
attached to it (by Article X of the Treaty) reaffirmed ·
textually the clauses of the Convention of the Straits. 11 2

1. Shotwell, ~· cit., pp. 510-11~
2. Hertslet, Map of Europe, II, p. 1250,
pp. 513-14.

Shotwell,~·

cit.,
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Article XI
"The Black Sea is neutralized; ii~s Waters end
Ports, · thrown open to the Mercantile Marine o:r every
Nation, are formally and perpetually interdicted to
the Flag of War, .either of the . Powers possessing its
Coasts, or of any other Power •••
Article XIII
"The Black Sea being neutralized according to
the terms of Article XI, the maintenance or establish~
. ment upon its Coast of Militarr-Mar~tim$ Ar3enals be~
comes ·alike unnecessa.ry and purposelessJ in conseq~unce,
His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, gnd His
Imperial Majesty the Sulten, engage not to ~~tablish
or to me.iptain upon the Coast Gtny Milite.ry-M~ritime
Arsenal. "l
Treaty of London, March 13, 1871
Article I
"Articles XI, XIII · and XIV of the Treaty of Paris
of the 30th March, 1856, as well as the special convention concluded between Russia and the Sublime Porte,
and annexed to the said Article XIV, are abrogated,
and replaced by the following article.
· Article II
"The princlple of the closing of the Straits of
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, such as it has been
established by the separate convention of the 30th
March, 1856, is maintained, with power to His Imperial
Majesty the Sultan to open the said Straits in time
of peace to vessels of war of friendly and allied Powers,
in case the Sublime Pol~te should judge it necessary in
order to secure the execution of the stipulations of
the Treaty of Paris of the 30th March, 1856.
Article III
"The Black Sea remains open, as heretofore, to
the mercantile marine of all nations.

1.

Shotwell,~· ~.,

pp. 514-15.
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Article VIII
"The high contracting parties renew andconf'irm
all stipulations of the Treaty of 30th March, 1856 1 as
well a.s of its annexes, which are not annulled or
modified by the present treaty."l

1. Hertelet, £2• oit., III, P• 1924, Shotwell,
PP• 525-27.

~·

o; t.,

r
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VI
The Russian Delegation's Draftl

-.. --

Regulations for the Passage of Vessels through
the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora
and the Bosphorus

Chapter I.--General Provisions
Al'tiole 1, The

t~rm

11

the Straits" used below ineludes

the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, the Bosphorus and the
islands in the Aegean Sea adjacent to the Straits (Swmothraoe, Imbros, Tenedos, Lemnos and Rabbit islands), as
well as the territorial waters of the Straits,
Art. 2.
confirmed,

The sovereignty of 'Iurkey over the Straits is
The islands of Samothrace and Lemnos are de-

olared to be autonomous,
Chapter II.--Rules for the Passage of Vessels
through the Straits
1. In Time of Peace
(a,) Merchant Vessels and Cmmnercial Aircraft.
Art. 3.

Complete freedom of passage through the

Straits for merchant vessels and connnercial aircraft
under any flag, by day and by night.
Commercial aircraft fly over the Straits in conformity
1. Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs 1922-1923
Records of Proceedings and Draft Terms of Peace. H•.
M. Stationery Office, London, 1923; pp. 250-253.

.

··--
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with the stipulations of the aerial: conventions signed by
the Turkish Government or the special rules published by
the said Government,
(b.) War Vessels and Military Aircraft.
Art. 4. In virtue of

long~established

principle, the

Straits are recognised as closed to the war vessels, including

submr-~.rines,

of all fleets 1 except that

Art. 5, Passage over the Straits ia

qf

Turkey,

prohi~~teq

all military aircraft, except those belonging to

to

~rkey,

Art, 6, In very exceptional cases, powever, and for
special definite reasons, the Turkish Government me;y, by
special decrees, which shall be published separately on
each occasion, authorise the passage of the Straits in
both directions by ligbt warships (submarines excluded)
of any flag, but on no account with a military object,
Art, 7. No landing shall be made within the Straits
by the light warships allowed by the TUrkish Government
to pass the Straits in virtue of article 6,

Neither may

any armament, engine of war, munitions nor any other war
material be landed from these vessels.
Art. 8, Every light warship authorised to pass the
Straits must notify the Turkish Government beforehand of
the time of its entrance into the Straits so as to enable
the said Government to verify the permission issued.

-.....

~ -- ~-
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2, In Time of War, Turkey being Neutral
(a,) Merchant Ves s els and Commercial Aircraft,
Art, 9, Article 3 of these regu;Lations remains .oper- ·
,~~o,

ative,

.

Turkey, however, will enjoy all the rights and

fulfil all the obligations prescribed by international
law in order to s afeguard her neutrality as a sovereign
State.
(b.) Warships and Mili.tary
Art, 10, l n

A~rcraft,

e~cQ~ tional

i ndividu&l

special definite reasons, the Turkish

case~

and for

Govarrun~nt

'

authorise the pas s age of the Straits by light*

may

ne~tral

warships (submarines excluded), in conformity with the
rules established by articles 6, 7,

a and 9,

Art, 11. No warship of the belligerent rowers
(submarines included), no military aircraft belonging to
the belligerent Po·w ers and no aircraft belonging to a
neutral Power will be allowed to pass the Straits,
3, In Time of War, Turkey being a Belligerent
(e..) Merchant Vessels and Connnerc1al Aircraft,

Art, 12. Merchant vessels and commercial aircraft of
neutral Powers will be allowed freely to pass the Straits
in conformity with articles 3 and 9 of these regulations,
Turkey, however, will enjoy the rights allowed by international law to Powers in a state of war; particularly,

*

"Light warships" are understood to be warships not exceeding 6 1 000 tons, with guns not exceeding 15 em.
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Turkey as a belligerent will have the right to search
merchant vessels passing through the Straits and commercial aircraft flying over the Straits.

Special rules for

the latter will be laid dovm by the Turkish Government.
Art. 13. To the merchant vessels and commercial. aircraft of enemy Powers Turkey will apply the international
rules in force on the subject.
(b.) Warships.
Art. 14. In

e~ceptional

individual

ca~es

and for
m~y

special definite reasons, the Turkish Qovernmant

authorise the passage of the Straits by light neutral
warships (submarines excluded), in conformity with the
rules established by articles 6 1 7, 8 and 9; subject to
the right of Turkey to apply the rules which she considers
necessary in her capacity as a belligerent party.
Chapter !!I.--Guarantees
Art. 15. Turkey undertakes towards all the signatories of these regulations jointly and to each
severally to see to the enforcement of these

signator~

regulatio~~·

Art. 16. In conformity with the provisions of articles
2 and 15 of these regulations Turkey, in order to safeguard
her sovereignty and to enforce the principle of the closure
of the Straits to

war~hips

and military aircraft, will

have the right to take all the necessary measures, and
particularly:-(a.) To maintain free from any restriction, within
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the zone of the Straits, military and naval
forces {submarines included) and air

fo~oes.

(b.) Freely to erect permanent fortifications and
permanent emplacements for artillery of any
calibre.
(c.) To lay mine-fields,
(d.) To construct military routes and railway$,
roa~~

and other means of communication

necess~ry

for ):ler defence,
(e.) To organise any methods of liaison and observation,
(f.) To maintain military and naval basea of

~efense,

end aerodromes,
(g.) Generally to organise the defence of' the Straits
by employing there all technical

~eaources

of'

warfare which are now and which may in the
future come into use.
Chapter IV.- .. Teclmic al Pr ovi si ons
Art, 17, Without prejudice to the sovereignty of
Turkey and with a view to provide for the needs of
commercial shipping, an international commission will
be constituted, consisting of one representative of each
littoral State of the Black Sea and one representative of
each of the following States:

Germany, United States of

America, France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan.
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Art, 18, The president of the commission will be the
Turkish delegate; the seat of the commission is fixed at
Constantinople,
Art. 19. Turkey undertakes to place at the disposal
of the commission the
camme~cial

numbe~

of pilots necessary to

ensu~e

navigation in the Straits.

Art. 20. The $tatute of the commission will be laid
down in detail in a special convention ,

w~icn

will be

drawn up with the oo-opere.tion of the States epec:U'ied in
a~ticle

17 within a period of three months from tne date

of the signature of these regulations,
Chapter V.--General Provisions
Art, 21. The contracting Powers are agreed to elabo~ate

the

and sign within three months from the adoption of

p~esent

regulation an international Act recognising

the Black Sea as a mare clausum of the littoral Powers,
/

even in the event of ch.enge s being me.de in the regime of
the Straits which modify the above stipulations.
Art. 22. These regulations shall remain in force for
ten years.

After the expiration of this period they may

be prolonged or revised.
(Formal clauses, ratification, &c., follow.)
Additional Decl aration
The Russian Ukrainian and Georgian delegation declare
that in the event of its draft regule.tions of the Straits

'l'lf''
llO

qu.estion being adopted by the Powers, Russia, the Ukraine
and Georgia undertake to propose to the littoral Governments
of the Black Sea the assembling of a conference with a view
to the adoption of reciprocal guarantees for the effective
security of their coasts.

G. CHICHERIN,
Principal Delegate of Ruse.ia,
the Ukraine and
Ouchy, Lausanne,
December 18, 1922.

Georgi~·

